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I.

INTRODUCTION

Affirmative action remains controversial in American jurisprudence
and society in general.1 Corporate policies, governmental programs and
judicial decisions merely touching on minority preferences generate
scathing media editorials and public outcry.2 The pro-affirmative action
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1. See, e.g., Laurel Rosenberg, Grutter v. Bollinger: Setting a Path for Diversity at
the University of South Carolina School of Law, 55 S.C. L. REV. 531, 531 (Spring 2004)
(“[Affirmative action] is one of the most controversial topics that the United States Supreme
Court has addressed in recent years.”); Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action
in Education: The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 187, 189 (Fall
2002) (beginning the article with the sentence: “Affirmative action is one of the most
controversial topics for constitutional scholars, perhaps for American society at large as
well”).
2. See, e.g., Students Outraged by Bush Attack on Affirmative Action, IN MOTION
MAGAZINE, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/idaa/rebush.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009)
(discussing the George W. Bush administration’s decision to challenge the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate and law school affirmative action policies); Ethan Bronner,
Conservatives Open Drive Against Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, available
at
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camp accuses opponents of holding back minority advancement. They
argue that this is especially problematic in a world where lawful
discrimination drastically impeded certain groups for centuries. Proponents
also argue that prejudice lingers—consciously and subconsciously—in
contemporary society.3 The anti-affirmative action camp counters with
warnings about the destruction of the meritocracy that makes America
great.4 Opponents also argue that a stamp of inferiority is placed on
minorities collectively when affirmative action benefits minorities
individually. Strong voices on either side continue to shoot down workable
solutions designed to facilitate equitable minority advancement.5
The United States Supreme Court—an institution capable of shining a
bright and guiding light on issues of equal protection and individual
rights—continually fails to provide clarity in the arena of minority
preferences. The Court’s most prominent affirmative action opinions: (1)
rarely gain large majorities (or any majority at all), (2) tend to alter
principles from previous precedent or muddy understanding through dicta
and (3) fail to articulate workable, somewhat standardized tests to evaluate
minority preference plans.
This leaves governments, educational
institutions, and private employers to struggle with this confusing “line” of
precedent as they make contracting, employment, and admissions decisions
in real time. All of this occurs in an economy where every contract, job,
and admission is a precious commodity.
This article moves away from heavily analyzed affirmative action
programs in higher education, public employment, and government
contracting and instead frames the looming battlefield: diversity-based,
non-remedial, voluntary preference programs created by private
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02EEDA1539F935A15752C0A96F9582
60 (discussing an advertising campaign with the headline: “On 15 campuses across the
country, students will open their college newspapers today to a full-page advertisement with
the headline: ‘Guilty by Admission’ and, in bold print, ‘Nearly Every Elite College in
America Violates the Law. Does Yours?’”).
3. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green and Alexandra Kalev, Symposium: DiscriminationReducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1435 (June 2008)
(discussing conscious and subconscious discrimination in the workplace and stating that
social science research “has revealed that discriminatory biases and reliance on stereotypes
in the workplace are not always conscious or motivated by animus”).
4. See generally, THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY, Yale University Press (2004) (examining the effects of affirmation action
in other countries); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM & MARY L.
REV. 33 (Fall 1992) (arguing against affirmative action).
5. See, e.g., Charles Kels, Finding a Middle Ground on Affirmative Action, DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN, Mar. 28, 2003, available at
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2003/03/28/Opini
on/Charles.Kels.Finding.A.Middle.Ground.On.Affirmative.Action-2154945.shtml
(“Like
most controversial issues from abortion to gun control, the affirmative action debate has
unfortunately been controlled by the extreme positions on either side.”).
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employers.6 Structured as such, corporate affirmative action plans of the
future will differ from historical efforts. In the past, minority preferences
sought to remedy proven workplace discrimination or documented societal
discrimination in particular job categories – a backward-looking rationale.
The contemporary rationale is more forward-looking and shines the
spotlight directly on workforce diversity for its own sake. Employerproponents of such plans argue that diversity focused efforts are necessary
to compete, market, innovate, think, and profit in today’s global
marketplace.
Accordingly, this article distinguishes the Remedial
Rationale of the past with the Diversity Spotlight Rationale of the future.7
More specifically, Part II defines workplace affirmative action,
examines its historical roots and then synthesizes relevant precedent from
the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts. Part III evaluates the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale and three key components required for
diversity-based plans to comply with such precedent. This analysis is
informed by the recent Grutter v. Bollinger decision, where prominent
private employers filed amici curiae briefs favoring diversity-based
affirmative action at the University of Michigan’s law school.8 Part IV
anticipates a potential Supreme Court case squarely confronting this topic
and discusses the likely decision in light of precedent from Part I and
current composition of the Supreme Court.9 This part argues that the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale—outside of the higher education realm—is
likely at odds with the prior opinions of at least five Justices on a
conservative-leaning Court. These facts lead to the prediction that private
employers will have a difficult time implementing voluntary affirmative
action plans without resorting to the Remedial Rationale and conceding
prior institutional or societal discrimination in relevant job categories. Part
V concludes with a summary of this new frontier and posits that the
controversy will continue even after the next prominent affirmative action
6. The relevant companies in this article are those governed by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000). Generally, Title VII covers
employers, engaged in an industry affecting commerce, employing fifteen or more
employees for at least a specific period of time. § 2000e(b) (Title VII also covers federal,
state and local governments as well as employment agencies and labor unions; however,
such covered entities are not covered in this article).
7. Spotlights are designed to call attention to a subject or make something more
prevalent. See, e.g., DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spotlight
(last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (defining spotlight as “a strong, focused light thrown upon a
particular spot . . . . for making some object, person, or group especially conspicuous.”).
This analogy is appropriate in the case of forward-looking, voluntary affirmative action
plans by employers who call attention to diversity aspects involving their workforces.
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; see also United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIOCLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (examples of landmark affirmative action precedents).
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II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE WORKPLACES, ITS HISTORY &
GOVERNING PRECEDENT
Affirmative action seeks to temporarily increase employment,
educational, and societal opportunities for qualified members of
underrepresented groups.10 Historically, affirmative action focused on
helping black citizens overcome the effects of prior discrimination and
segregation. Early plans attacked racial barriers obstructing employment
opportunities11 and contract rights.12 This approach was colorblind and
required employers to subtract an individual’s race from the decision10. For a similar definition of affirmative action see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using
the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the
Case For Affirmative Action. 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 114 n.2 (Spring 2005); see also
Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 n.3
(2003) (defining affirmative action as “minority-mindfulness in decision-making resulting
in either a preference or a disproportionate distribution of benefits.”); Martha S. West, The
Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 614 (1998) (defining
affirmative action similarly by stating that “affirmative action has come to mean any type of
program or policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into account. To be eligible
for the benefits of affirmative action in employment, a person must meet two requirements:
[1] The person must be a member of a group that has been historically underrepresented . . .
and [2] the person must be otherwise qualified . . .”). Professor William W. Van Alstyne
delves more deeply into the many different aspects and definitions of affirmative action in a
recent article. Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1517 (Fall 2000). The term
affirmative action comes from the labor-management relations arena where “employers
found guilty of unfair labor practices regarding employee attempts to organize could be
required take steps to assure a work environment free of threats against future employee
organizing activities.” See, e.g., COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, A REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, at 30 (Aug. 1987) [hereinafter H.R.
DOC. NO. 110-L].
11. See, e.g., Corrine E. Anderson, Comment: A Current Perspective: The Erosion of
Affirmative Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181, 185-91 [hereinafter
Current Perspective] (discussing the impetus behind the Fourteenth Amendment and stating
that “African Americans were the intended beneficiaries of the earliest forms of affirmative
action.”). See generally Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and
the Interpretation of its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291
(Winter 1996) [hereinafter Historical Review] (discussing the history of affirmative action
in depth).
12. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) [hereinafter Section 1981] ( “[A]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”). This section
was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, although it has been amended, is still a major
weapon against discrimination. See, e.g., Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to
Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor
Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 184 (2006) ( “Section 1981’s ‘make and enforce contracts’
clause has played an active role in modern anti-discrimination law”).
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making equation. Over time, the efficacy of purely colorblind affirmative
action was questioned and plans morphed into color-conscious minority
preferences.13 Although these preference-based plans often excluded Asian
Americans, they brought other underrepresented groups—such as Native
Americans, Hispanics and females—under the umbrella.14 In the 1960s and
1970s, preference-based affirmative action gained traction and spread into
different areas of American life and commerce.15 As a result, today’s
affirmative action plans are created, or judicially imposed, in the following
five arenas: (1) government contracting,16 (2) public education,17 (3)
13. See, e.g., JOHN DAVID SKRETNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 80-81 (1996) (discussing the earliest forms of
affirmative action and stating that when President Lyndon Johnson assumed power “he
continued Kennedy’s . . . color-blind course. His tenure began with two major initiatives,
both designed to protect Americans regardless of race.”).
14. See, e.g., Current Perspective, supra note 11, at 190 (discussing how the first
Executive Orders requiring affirmative action in government contracting banned
discrimination based on race and other categories such as creed and national origin);
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 619 (analyzing an affirmative action plan intended to benefit particular
minority groups and women).
15. See e.g., Harvey Gee, Guest Commentary. Asian-Americans and Affirmative Action,
DENV. POST, May 7, 2008, available at http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_9172477
(stating that:
“It is apparent that under the guidelines of these [affirmative action] programs,
Asian Americans are not seen as sufficiently disadvantaged or underrepresented to warrant the same consideration offered to African Americans and
Latinos. The virtual absence of Asian Americans from affirmative action
analysis is troubling and demonstrates the need for the Asian American voice to
be heard. This tendency to exclude Asian Americans from the affirmative
action debate is disingenuous. Perhaps it is reflective of the erroneous belief that
Asian Americans do not or should not benefit from affirmative action.”);
see also Christopher Marquis, Woman in the News; A Washington Veteran for Labor;
A Tested Negotiator for Trade; Elaine Lan Chao, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A-17
(quoting former Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao who stated:
“[that Asian-Americans] have also been tremendously damaged by affirmative
action. . . . Many Asian-Americans are excluded from minority procurement
programs [and] are not considered to be minorities in the full sense of the word
– positive and negative – and quota systems in the best universities in this land
exclude qualified Asian-Americans.").
16. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-10 (1995) (dealing
with affirmative action efforts by the federal government intended to encourage government
contractors to subcontract with small businesses controlled by “socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78
(1989) (dealing with affirmative action efforts by a city government whereby “prime
contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts [were required] to subcontract
at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business
Enterprises . . . [defined as businesses at least fifty-one percent] owned and controlled . . .
by minority group members . . . [such as] Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts”); see also Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D.
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organized labor,18 (4) public employment,19 and (5) private employment.20
The remainder of Part II is divided into two sections. The first focuses
on the history of color-conscious, preference-based affirmative action in
the private employment arena. The second section analyzes the line of
precedent formed from legal challenges to such employer preference
programs. This discussion provides the historical and legal background
necessary for Part III and the key components of private, voluntary
affirmative action plans created under the Diversity Spotlight rationale.
A. The Emergence of Preference-Based Affirmative Action in the Private
Employment Arena
In 1954, the Supreme Court declared that government-sanctioned,
separate but equal treatment according to race is unconstitutional.21 Acting
on this mandate, the federal government experimented with ideas to
ameliorate racial tensions persisting after Brown v. Board of Education.
Modern affirmative action was born out of such efforts.22 The American
Nev. 1979) (discussing an affirmative action plan voluntarily created to comply with
Executive Order 11246 in contract dealings with the Atomic Energy Commission).
17. Oftentimes affirmative action plans public education at the undergraduate and
graduate levels. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-16 (analyzing an affirmative action plan
created by the law school at a public university to benefit “racial and ethnic diversity with
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who
without this commitment might not be represented in [Michigan Law School’s] student
body in meaningful numbers”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-73 (2003) (discussing
an affirmative action plan created by a public university for its undergraduate College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts designed to benefit blacks, Hispanics and Native
Americans). In some situations, affirmative action plans also target kindergarten through
high school education. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (discussing two separate affirmative action plans – public elementary
school assignments in Louisville, Kentucky and public high school assignments in Seattle,
Washington).
18. See, e.g., Breschard v. Dir. Guild of Am., 1984 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19766, at 4-5 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (discussing Directors Guild of America and its attempts to create affirmative
action plans to combat a “history of discrimination against its women and racial minority
members by . . . . production companies”).
19. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir.
1996) (analyzing an affirmative action plan at a public high school using Title VII as a
guide).
20. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-200 (analyzing an affirmative action plan created
by a private employer as part of a collective bargaining agreement intended to benefit black
craft workers); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623-27 (analyzing an affirmative action plan under
Title VII created to benefit women and minorities who had been underrepresented in major
job classifications).
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. See, e.g., Richard N. Appel, Alison L. Gray, and Nilufer Loy, The 40th Anniversary
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Symposium: Affirmative Action in the
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workplace—with its historically discriminatory practices23—became one of
the government’s initial targets.24
In 1961, President Kennedy issued an Executive Order which focused
the attention of the Executive Branch on discrimination in employment.
Executive Order 10925 codified a concept labeled “affirmative action”25
which prohibited discrimination by companies contracting with the federal
government against any “employee or applicant for employment.” This
legally enforceable presidential decree required that such contractors’
employment decisions be made without regard to race, creed, color,
religion or national origin.26 President Kennedy did not mandate that

Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549, 551-52 (Spring 2005)
[hereinafter 40th Anniversary] (“[Although the] concept of legislating equal employment in
the private sector may be traced back to various constitutional amendments, Reconstruction,
and New Deal Era legislation, the modern day concept of affirmative action evolved from
the social unrest of the 1950s. During that decade, race relations became a societal flash
point, leading to the reexamination of state sponsored segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education . . . Although the actual process of desegregation stretched out for decades, the
Brown cases paved the way for broader social reform.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
23. See, e.g., Michael L. Foreman, Kristin M. Dadey, and Audrey J. Wiggins, The
Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the
Nation’s Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 83 (collecting cases and stating that
in the “period following the passage of Title VII, a number of lawsuits were filed in an
effort to dismantle the kind of systemic discrimination that was deeply ingrained in the
American workplace.”).
24. See, e.g., Historical Review, supra note 11, at 301-02 (discussing the fact that
discrimination in employment continued well beyond the Brown decision and the attempts
made by government to end such discrimination).
25. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1961), [hereinafter E.O. 10925]
(establishing the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity). This order did
not lay out any steps that such affirmative action plans should take. See, e.g., 40th
Anniversary, supra note 22, at 552-53. This Executive Order was superseded by Executive
Order 11246, discussed below; however, Executive Order 10925 remains important for its
historical significance. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Executive Orders
Disposition
Tables,
President
John
F.
Kennedy,
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1961-kennedy.html.
26. E.O. 10925 (declaring that government contractors “will not discriminate against
any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin .
. . [and] will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or
national origin.”). Interestingly, under Executive Order 10925, religion was a protected
class only in the government employment category and not in the subcontractor employment
category and creed was a protected class only in the subcontractor employment category.
Compare E.O. 10925, Part II – Nondiscrimination in Government Employment (prohibiting
discrimination against “any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal
Government because of race, color, religion, or national origin”) with E.O. 10925, Part III –
Obligations of Government Contractors and Subcontractors (“[C]ontractors will not
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed,
color or national origin”).
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contractors grant preferences to minorities. From the perspective of
affirmative action, Executive Order 10925 declared only that employment
decisions be made free from any consideration of race or color – in other
words, such decisions had to be colorblind.
Congress incorporated the colorblind thrust of this and subsequent
Executive Orders27 into its most significant piece of civil rights legislation
since 1866. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196428 made it illegal for a
covered employer29 to:
[F]ail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”30

27. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, Part II, Subpart B –
Contractors Agreement, § 202 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006),
available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/ofccp/regs/statutes/eo11246.htm (currently requiring,
among other things, a government contractor to create an affirmative action program and to
provide a written affirmation that it “will not discriminate against any employee or applicant
for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . [and] take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin”);
Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985, § 1 (1969), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1994), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/eo11478/eo11478.html (“[It is]
the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, or age, and to promote the full realization of
equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each executive
department and agency.”); Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980), reprinted
in
42
U.S.C.
§
2000d-1
(1994),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/byagency/eo12250.php (attempting to eliminate discrimination
in federal programs and programs receiving federal funds); Exec. Order No. 12,259, 46 Fed.
Reg. 1,253, § 1-602 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994), available at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12259.html (requiring
consistency from federal agencies in implementing Executive Order 12,250).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). See also Historical Review, supra note 11, at 303-07
(“Congress strengthened Executive Order 10,925 by incorporating it into Titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby providing the legislative basis for equal
employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs. The United States Senate
explicitly noted that the Act included the affirmative action program set forth in Executive
Order 10,925 in the administration provisions of Title VII.”) (citations omitted).
29. Under Title VII the term "employer" means “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In addition, Title VII makes it unlawful for a covered
employer to:
[L]imit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
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A subsequent section of Title VII dealt more specifically with
affirmative action and declared:
Nothing [in Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons . . . in any community . . . or in the available work
force.31
These operative provisions, strictly interpreted, broadly ban
discrimination against individuals with protected status (i.e., race, color,
religion, sex and national origin) in covered workplaces. Through its
express language, Title VII disincentivizes employers from implementing
affirmative action programs that preference minority groups and inherently
discriminate against whites “because of” race. In fact, the only express
approval of affirmative action in the statute allows a court to implement
preferences as a remedy only after making a determination that a covered
employer has “intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice.”32 In such situations, a “court may enjoin
[an employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”33
Opponents of affirmative action quickly claimed that Title VII’s
colorblind provisions—working in tandem—banned all minority
preference plans voluntarily created by private employers.34 Proponents of

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See also Historical Review, supra note 11, at 309
(“Nothing in the federal statutes requires a private firm to incorporate affirmative action
programs into its employment strategy. The private sector can only be required to undertake
affirmative action when ordered by a court, upon a finding that the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination.”).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See also H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, supra note 10, at 37
(“[Courts have] ordered employers to hire or promote equal numbers of minority and nonminority employees up to a certain percentage of the workforce . . . [and] ordered public and
private employers to adopt special recruitment and testing policies designed to assure
opportunities for minorities and women to compete [for] jobs.”).
34. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that:
With a clarity which, had it not proven so unavailing, one might well
recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 declares that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer: (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
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affirmative action staked their claim to the fact that the express language of
Title VII does not expressly forbid voluntary affirmative action plans and
that its legislative history actually encourages precisely this type of
minority assistance.35
Adding to the confusion was the fact that—while the statute is clear in
its anti-discrimination mandate—Title VII does not specify the elements of
discriminatory conduct. This omission left the primary interpretation to the
court system. Judicial decisions interpreting Title VII soon created a
bifurcated liability structure for employers accused of discrimination.
Under these interpretations, Title VII prohibits both (1) intentional
discrimination (disparate treatment)36 and (2) unintentional discrimination
caused by company decisions which are facially neutral but have a
discriminatory impact (disparate impact).37 Facing decades of historical
discrimination and confronted with an expanding liability structure
punishing such practices, employers struggled to make amends. When

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .” The Court today
completes the process of converting this from a guarantee that race or sex will
not be the basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often
will.)
35. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that:
The logic of antidiscrimination legislation requires that judicial constructions of
Title VII leave "breathing room" for employer initiatives to benefit members of
minority groups. If Title VII had never been enacted, a private employer would
be free to hire members of minority groups for any reason that might seem
sensible from a business or a social point of view. The Court's opinion in Weber
reflects the same approach; the opinion relied heavily on legislative history
indicating that Congress intended that traditional management prerogatives be
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible (citations omitted)).
36. Plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination generally prove a Title VII violation in
one of two ways: (1) direct evidence of intentional discrimination and (2) circumstantial
evidence of intentional discrimination. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111 (1985) (analyzing a case of alleged intentional discrimination under the direct
evidence standard); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)
(analyzing alleged intentional discrimination and creating a prima facie case for instances of
circumstantial evidence of discrimination); Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal
Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507, 525-26
(Winter 1995) (discussing the creation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and
stating that this “formulation was entirely new, and the Court neither cited to any of the
lower court cases nor to the earlier jury discrimination cases for support.”).
37. The Supreme Court addressed the disparate impact type of discrimination in the
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (analyzing a facially neutral
employment requirements—such as obtaining a high school diploma and passing scores on
standardized tests—and stating that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [employees due to
race] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).
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considering an affirmative action-type program, executives had to make
sense of the explicit provisions of Title VII urging colorblind decisionmaking and the statute’s seemingly contradictory mandate to eliminate the
vestiges of prior discrimination. As it did in 1961, the Executive Branch
attempted clarification by attempting to legitimize a different type of
affirmative action – this time in the form of minority preference programs
instead of colorblindness.
In 1970, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP) began to encourage a preference-based approach to affirmative
action. The OFCCP initiated enforcement programs which required private
employers to “implement numerical goals and timetables” for minority
advancement.38 Around the same time, the Department of Justice began to
seek preference-based “affirmative action-type remedies in employment
discrimination cases, including numerical goals and timetables.”39 Finally,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) applied pressure
to companies and advocated for the implementation of preference-based
affirmative action plans.40 Through its newly-created National Programs
Division, the EEOC initiated investigations into major American
companies, such as IBM and Sears,41 attempting to increase hiring of
minorities and women.42 In addition, segments of the public were
encouraged by advocacy groups to bring pressure—via community
boycotts and reciprocal trade agreements—to spur companies to voluntarily
create affirmative action plans.43
Employers desiring to implement affirmative action to remedy past
wrongs could find some comfort in the express governmental approval of
preference-based plans. However, the government failed to provide much
guidance on the limits, proper context and valid structure of such plans.

38. Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (2004) (“[A] contractor’s
[affirmative action] program shall provide in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal
employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs of members of minority groups,
including, when there are deficiencies, the development of specific goals and time tables for
the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity.”). See also 40th
Anniversary, supra note 22, at 553.
39. 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 553 (collecting cases).
40. See H.R. DOC. NO.110-L, supra note 10, at 38.
41. Id.
42. Id. (stating that the EEOC made the assumption that, considering its limited
resources, “economies of scale would be achieved by focusing major staff resources on a
few large firms in the hope that success with them would encourage other firms voluntarily
to strengthen their affirmative action policies.”). This pressure had limited short-term
effectiveness. Id. (stating that the EEOC’s strategy was “not entirely successful” and that it
resulted in long legal battles with little changes in affirmative action policies).
43. Id. at 38-39 (stating that private organizations used “community based support to
persuade public and private employers to adopt affirmative action measures beneficial to
minorities and women.”).
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The EEOC attempted clarification in 1979 via guidelines designed to walk
employers through the creation of voluntary affirmative action plans.44
These guidelines pronounced the agency’s opinion that Title VII was not
intended to expose employers to reverse discrimination liability based on
the implementation of preference-based affirmative action.45 Accordingly,
the guidelines stated that voluntary affirmative action might be taken when:
(1) an analysis reveals that existing or contemplated employment
practices are likely to cause an actual or potential adverse impact;
(2) a comparison between the employer's workforce and the
appropriate labor pool reveals that it is necessary to correct the
effects of prior discriminatory practices; and (3) a limited labor
pool of qualified minorities and women for employment or
promotional opportunities exists due to historical restrictions by
employers, labor organizations, or others.46
Employers who implement preference plans under these guidelines
must: (1) conduct a reasonable self-analysis of current employment
practices, (2) have a reasonable basis for concluding that action is
appropriate, and (3) take reasonable action.47 If employers use good faith
in attempting to meet these criteria then they can claim a safe harbor for
their affirmative action programs – at least according to the EEOC.48
At the end of the day, however, merely having EEOC guidance has
not proven extremely comforting to private employers. In fact, companies
operating under Title VII, the various Executive Orders, OFCCP and
Department of Justice guidance and/or the EEOC guidelines remain leery
as they were in the 1960s. On one hand, employers realize that
discrimination and the effects of prior discrimination persist in the
workplace and that they are potentially liable for each and every

44. Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, As
Amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (2004).
45. Statement of Purpose, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2004) (“Voluntary affirmative action to
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order
to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in title VII.”).
46. Circumstances under which Affirmative Action is Appropriate, 29 C.F.R. §
1608.3(a)-(c) (2004).
47. Establish Affirmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (2004).
48. See Standard of Review, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.10(b) (2004) (stating that, if an employer
claims it relied on an affirmative action plan, the EEOC will determine if an employer’s
reliance on such plan is true); id. at 1608.2 (stating that, if an employer’s affirmative action
plan complies with the EEOC guidelines, the EEOC will issue a no-cause determination in
response to a discrimination charge); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1) (stating that Title
VII liability will not result from an employer’s good faith reliance on any written
interpretation or opinion of the EEOC). It is important to note that these guidelines
specially allow affirmative action under the Remedial Rationale and seemingly not under
the Diversity Spotlight Rationale – a topic reserved for Part IV.
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employment decision they make. On the other hand, employers understand
the simple, non-discriminatory language of Title VII and the potential for
reverse discrimination lawsuits. Without clear guidance from the Supreme
Court, employers even today find themselves walking “a high tightrope
without a net beneath them . . . . On one side lies the possibility of liability
to minorities in private actions . . . . On the other side is the threat of private
suits by white employees.”49 Nevertheless, organizations have continued to
combat workplace discrimination via preference-based affirmative action.50
As mentioned in Part I, the Remedial Rationale formed the
justification of such efforts for decades.51 Today, however, employers are
implementing a different strategy preferring to use affirmative action to
foster a diverse workforce rather than admit and remedy past
discrimination. In other words, the Diversity Spotlight Rationale currently
outshines the Remedial Rationale.52
49. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Affirmative Action
Benefiting Particular Employers or Prospective Employees as Violating Other Employees’
Rights Under Federal Constitution or Under Federal Civil Rights Legislation – Supreme
Court Cases, 92 L. ED. 2D 849, 2(A) (2009) (discussing this issue and stating that:
“in attempting to rectify the effects of past discriminatory practices, courts and
others frequently find themselves in a dilemma: the only way to correct past
discrimination sometimes seems to be the imposition of discrimination on
members of the male sex or the white majority--that is, a preference given to
one group automatically discriminates against all other persons who are not
members of that group and who are in competition with it, and thus results in a
form of discrimination which some courts have styled ‘inverse’ or ‘majority’
discrimination, but which most courts have called ‘reverse’ discrimination.”),
40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 559 (stating:
“[V]oluntary efforts result in an obvious tension with Title VII’s prohibitions on
discrimination. Title VII's literal language imposes liability for discrimination
against any person on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
which contrasts with Congress' intent to encourage voluntary action by
employers in creating employment opportunities for minorities and women,
which may include preferential treatment of one race or gender of employees
over another.”) (citations omitted).
50. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, supra note 10, at 30 (“[The] prototype for an
affirmative action program [implemented by a private employer] was the agreement signed
by the Lockheed aircraft company in 1961 after a complaint against its employment
practices . . . was filed by the NAACP.”). This plan required the company to take “special
efforts to recruit and employ black workers in both white and blue collar jobs.” Id. Many
of the early affirmative action plans went by the name Plan for Progress. Id.
51. One of the first affirmative action plans was entered into after a complaint was filed
by the NAACP. Id. There is evidence that these early plans were ineffective. Id. (stating
that 103 of the earliest affirmative action plans only increased the number of blacks
employed within companies with such plans from 5.1 percent to 5.7 percent over a two year
period).
52. See, e.g., 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 559 (“The vast majority of affirmative
action programs in the United States do not fall into either the government contract or court-
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With this history in mind, how should businesses desiring to
implement diversity-based affirmative action programs proceed? The best
course of action is deceptively simple. Employers should understand and
comply with EEOC guidance but, more importantly, adhere as closely as
possible to recent Supreme Court precedent. This strategy is advisable
because the Court has the final say under Title VII and has “not yet
determined whether the EEOC guidelines are entitled to deference by the
courts.”53 In addition, the EEOC guidelines are “rarely cited in litigation on
this topic.”54 This reality places the EEOC guidelines, and their express
approval of affirmative action, on uncertain ground. On the other hand,
affirmative action law “has been shaped by Supreme Court jurisprudence”
interpreting Title VII.55 With the importance of judicial precedent in mind,
the next section discusses six Supreme Court decisions that have the
potential to define the limits of voluntary, private affirmative action plans
under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale.56
B. Supreme Court Precedent Governing Workplace Minority Preferences
The Supreme Court approaches workplace affirmative action similarly
to other cases stemming from legislation – as an exercise in statutory
interpretation. However, the Court’s interpretation of Title VII has been
less than predictable. This confusion is partially explained by the tension
between the statute’s explicit anti-discriminatory language and its remedial
purpose. The remainder is attributable to the shifting ideological
composition of the Court between major cases. Part II concludes with a
discussion of six Supreme Court cases relevant to private workplace
affirmative action. This analysis dissects the reasoning of each majority
opinion, as well as important concurrences and dissents, and demonstrates
how each case might impact voluntary, private affirmative action plans
under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale. The following holdings are
highlighted below:
1) Reverse Discrimination violates Title VII (BURGER
COURT/McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.);

ordered categories. Rather, most initiatives are voluntary efforts implemented by employers
to further equal opportunity.”).
53. Id. at 560.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Title VII is the primary law governing voluntary affirmative action plans because
such plans do not involve state action. See, e.g., Historical Review, supra note 11, at 313-14
(“Private affirmative action is unique because neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable; there is no government action involved. Therefore, plaintiffs
seeking redress from private affirmative action programs are required to use Title VII.”).
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2) Title VII permits affirmative action under the Remedial
Rationale to combat conspicuous racial and gender imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories (BURGER COURT/United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber) & (REHNQUIST
COURT/Johnson v. Transportation Agency);
3) Diversity-based affirmative action allowing for individualized
consideration can be a compelling interest in higher education
admissions systems under the Equal Protection Clause
(REHNQUIST COURT/Gratz v. Bollinger & Grutter v. Bollinger);
and
4) Diversity-based affirmative action is not a compelling interest
in primary and secondary school selection under the Equal
Protection Clause (ROBERTS COURT/Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District).
(1) Reverse Discrimination Violates Title VII-McDonald
Arguably, the line of workplace affirmative action precedent began
with McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.57 In McDonald, two
white employees and their black colleague were suspected of theft
stemming from the same incident.58 The company terminated the white
employees but retained the black employee without good cause.59 This led
to a Title VII lawsuit alleging racial discrimination.60 A unanimous Court
held that employers cannot discipline white employees more harshly than
black employees for the same infraction.61 More generally, the majority
interpreted Title VII as prohibiting discrimination directed at any race – not
only discrimination directed at blacks.62 In the words of Justice Thurgood
57. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
58. Id. at 275-76.
59. Id. at 276.
60. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting the discrimination against “any
individual,” in the employment context, due to “such individual’s race”). The plaintiffs also
claimed a violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. McDonald, 427 U.S. at
276.
61. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 (holding that “[w]hile [an employer] may decide that
participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualifi[ed] [sic] for employment,
this criterion must be ‘applied, alike to members of all races,’ and Title VII is violated if, as
petitioners alleged, it was not.”). The District Court determined Section 1981 to be “wholly
inapplicable to racial discrimination against white persons” and determined that it lacked
jurisdiction over both the Section 1981 claim and the Title VII claim. Id. at 277. The final
unanimous vote was 7-0 as Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate. Id. at 274.
62. Id. at 280 (“We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination
against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable
were they Negroes and [the black employee who was charged but not terminated] white.”).
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Marshall, Title VII “prohibits all racial discrimination in employment.”63
McDonald was not based on an explicit affirmative action plan which
preferred minorities in disciplinary decisions. However, the Court’s colorblind interpretation of Title VII left existing preference programs in serious
jeopardy. Because preferences inherently discriminate on the basis of race,
this decision provided white employees injured by affirmative action plans
with powerful ammunition. To find a safe harbor, companies are forced to
distinguish the facts of McDonald from their affirmative action programs.
Today, employers are wise to argue that their minority preferences
distinguish by race, but in a positive manner intended to advance Title
VII’s mandate to eliminate discriminatory treatment, which harms
protected classes. This is a concept controversially referred to as “benign
discrimination.”64 The Court’s next relevant affirmative action decision
answered the major question left open after McDonald: whether Title VII
forbids private employers from voluntarily engaging in benign
discrimination by providing racial preferences to remedy prior
discrimination.65
(2) Title VII Permits Affirmative Action under the Remedial Rationale
to Combat Conspicuous Imbalances in Traditionally Segregated
Job Categories–Weber & Johnson
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber66 constituted the Court’s
first foray into private workplace affirmative action.67 In 1974, the Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corporation—together with the United
Steelworkers union—crafted an affirmative action plan.68 This plan was
not designed to remedy rampant institutional discrimination by Kaiser.69
63. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original). The Court also held that Section 1981 prohibited
discrimination against white employees by a private sector employer. Id. at 286-87.
64. See, e.g., Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“So called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their
patronizing indulgence.”).
65. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1979) (“[This
issue] was expressly left open in [McDonald] which held . . . that Title VII protects whites
as well as blacks from certain forms of racial discrimination.”).
66. Id. at 201.
67. See, e.g., 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 561 (“[S]hortly after issuance of the
EEOC's regulations [discussed in Part II(A)], the Supreme Court decided the first case
involving the permissible contours of voluntary affirmative action plans in the private
sector.”).
68. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
69. This issue of whether Kaiser actually discriminated in the past is a bit complicated.
See id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In this litigation, Kaiser denies prior
discrimination but concedes that its past hiring practices may be subject to question.”);
Phillip P. Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture: Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169,
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Instead, its racial preferences targeted the effects of prior discrimination by
craft unions, which had denied blacks training opportunities required for
employment as craftsmen.70 The goal was to increase the number of black
craft employees in Kaiser’s aluminum plant.71 To meet this objective, the
company created a new training program along with two seniority lists for
craft trainees – one for white employees and the other for black
employees.72 For every white trainee selected, a black selection was
required.73 These preferences would last until the plant’s percentage of
black skilled craft workers approximated the percentage of blacks in the
local labor force.74 Weber, a white craft worker with more seniority than
some of the black craft workers hired under the plan,75 was denied
admission to the training and filed a Title VII lawsuit alleging racial
discrimination.76
In a controversial decision,77 the Supreme Court upheld the plan ruling
1172 (March 2000) [hereinafter Wisdom] (“Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craft workers for [its
aluminum] plant only persons with prior experience in the craft. At [the plant relevant in
Weber], this approach had resulted in a segregated workforce because blacks had
historically been excluded from craft unions.”) (citations omitted).
70. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99.
71. Id. at 197-200. Nearly 40% of the labor force in Kaiser’s neighborhood was black
but less than 2% of these black employees worked in the craft division; this disparity was
caused in a large part by racial discrimination, as backs were not allowed by local unions to
train for craft positions. Id. at 198-99 (stating that:
“This case arose from the operation of the plan at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy,
La. Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craft workers for that plant only persons who
had had prior craft experience. Because blacks had long been excluded from
craft unions, few were able to present such credentials. As a consequence, prior
to 1974 only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled craft workers at the Gramercy
plant were black, even though the work force in the Gramercy area was
approximately 39% black.”) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 199.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1173 (stating that:
“[T]he training program would have required quite a long implementation
period, ending only when the percentage of African-American craft workers at
the plant rose from the less than two percent in 1974 to a figure of thirty-nine
percent, which was then the percentage of blacks in the local workforce.”)
(citations omitted).
75. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199; see also Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1173 (stating that
Weber had more seniority than two of the seven black trainees selected).
76. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199-200 (stating that Weber brought a class action lawsuit in a
federal district court in Louisiana). The Court also reiterated the fact that, because no state
action was involved, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
inapplicable. Id. at 200.
77. See, e.g., What the Weber Ruling Does, TIME, July 9, 1979, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,920466,00.html (“[The Weber] ruling
will undoubtedly breed some resentment. Weber himself last week predicted that the
decision will have ‘a negative effect on people all over the country toward blacks.’”); Don
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that Title VII allows voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans78
when:
1) Preferences are intended to “eliminate conspicuous racial
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories”;79
2) The rights of white employees are “not unnecessarily
trammeled”—-meaning that the plan neither (a) requires the
Munro, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action under Title VII: New
Directions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REV. 565, 576 (1995) (“[The]
Supreme Court specifically upheld voluntary affirmative action by private employers in its
controversial decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber in 1979.”) (citations omitted).
78. The following chart lists each Justice sitting in Weber and each Justice’s decision in
the case:
Case

United
Steelworkers
v. Weber

Justice

Opinion Type

Reasoning

Blackmun (concur)

Majority

Plan does not violate
Title VII

Brennan (opinion)

Majority

Plan does not violate
Title VII

Burger (dissent)

Minority

Plan violates Title VII

Marshall

Majority

Plan does not violate
Title VII

No Opinion

Did not Participate

Rehnquist (dissent)

Minority

Plan Violates Title VII

Stevens

No opinion

Did not Participate

Stewart

Majority

Plan does not violate
Title VII

White

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

5-2
Private
Employer
Affirmative
Action Plan
Does
Not
Violate Title
VII

Powell

It appears that Justice Powell did not participate, because he had been sick at the time of the
case, and that Justice Stevens did not participate, because he had previously represented
Kaiser as a private attorney in Illinois. See Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1175.
79. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (“[T]he adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the
Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”).
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termination of white employees and their replacement with black
employees nor (b) creates an absolute bar to the advancement of
white employees;80 and
3) Preferences are temporary in their duration.81
Because Kaiser’s plan met these three requirements, its race-based
classifications did not run afoul of Title VII.82 The majority identified that
its decision may seem at odds with the letter of Title VII, but argued that it
was within the statute’s spirit.83 In addition, Justice Brennan’s opinion did

80. Id. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white
employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement
with new black hirees. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white
employees; half of those trained in the program will be white.”) (citations omitted).
81. Id. (“[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft
trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled
craftworkers [sic] in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force.”).
82. Id. at 204-06 (stating:
“Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the language and
legislative history of § 703(j) of Title VII. Opponents of Title VII raised two
related arguments against the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be
interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant
preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate. Second, they
argued that employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant
preferential treatment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the
Act. Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action, as
respondent urges, it easily could have answered both objections by providing
that Title VII would not require or permit racially preferential integration
efforts. But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather, Congress added §
703(j) which addresses only the first objection. The section provides that
nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer . . .
to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because of the race . . . of such .
. . group on account of" a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work
force. The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted
to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances. The
natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary raceconscious affirmative action.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 201-02 (“It is a ‘familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of
its makers.’ The prohibition against racial discrimination in . . . Title VII must therefore be
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context
from which the Act arose.”) (citations omitted). Not all scholars believe that Title VII’s
anti-discrimination provisions are clear. See, e.g., Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1179
(discussing sections § 703(a)(1)-(2), (d) of Title VII and stating that these three provisions
contain “language that can be rather easily read as invalidating the Kaiser/Steelworkers
apprenticeship program. In a sense, though, that is as much an analytical problem for
Weber as a benefit. If the statute is to have textual integrity, it should not have provisions
that overlap each other in varying degrees of specificity and varying breadths of
coverage.”).
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not cabin the validity of affirmative action under Title VII to Weber’s
narrow facts. Instead, the majority expressly stated that the Court “need
not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and
impermissible affirmative action plans.”84
In an interesting concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed that Kaiser’s
plan was valid but intimated that the majority had gone too far with its
expansive view of permissible affirmative action.85 He read Brennan’s
opinion to mean that a private sector employer need not point to prior
institutional discrimination or even to “arguable” violations of Title VII
before choosing to preference one race over another.86 Blackmun believed
that remedying this type of societal discrimination went further than Title
VII allowed.87
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent took a much stronger position. Burger
argued that Kaiser’s plan violated the express language of Title VII.88 In
stating that this case should have been a no-brainer, Burger claimed that:
Often we have difficulty interpreting statutes either because of
imprecise drafting or because legislative compromises have
produced genuine ambiguities. But here there is no lack of
clarity, no ambiguity. The quota embodied in the collectivebargaining agreement between Kaiser and the Steelworkers
unquestionably discriminates on the basis of race against
individual employees seeking admission to on-the-job training
84. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
85. Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“‘Traditionally segregated job categories,’
where they exist, sweep far more broadly than the class of ‘arguable violations’ of Title VII.
The Court’s expansive approach is somewhat disturbing for me . . . .”). Some legal
scholarship on the matter concluded that Brennan’s opinion was not as well thought out and
articulated as it could have been considering that the case arose at the end of the Court’s
term. See Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1177 (“[W]ith all due respect for Justice Brennan . . .
the opinion is a failure: it so lacks persuasive methodological power as to raise questions . .
. about the Court's candor in identifying the real reasons why five Justices voted as they
did.”).
86. Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (“The Court, however, declines to consider the narrow
‘arguable violation’ approach and adheres instead to an interpretation of Title VII that
permits affirmative action by an employer whenever the job category in question is
‘traditionally segregated.’ . . . [T]he Court considers a job to be ‘traditionally segregated’
when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion . . . .”).
87. Id. at 212-15 (stating that:
“[T]he Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it was adopting a
principle of nondiscrimination that would apply to blacks and whites alike.
While setting aside that principle can be justified where necessary to advance
statutory policy by encouraging reasonable responses as a form of voluntary
compliance that mitigates “arguable violations,” discarding the principle of
nondiscrimination where no countervailing statutory policy exists appears to be
at odds with the bargain struck when Title VII was enacted.”).
88. Id. at 216-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court’s judgment . . . is
contrary to the explicit language of the statute” and citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)).
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programs. And, under the plain language of [Title VII], that is
"an unlawful employment practice."89
Eight years later, with two new Justices on the bench, the Supreme
Court faced its second major workplace affirmative action case. Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County90 analyzed a voluntary
affirmative action plan by the Santa Clara County government. This plan
attempted to remedy low percentages of women, minorities, and
handicapped individuals within the County’s employ.91 The terms of the
plan did not allow quota-based hiring and promotion but advocated that
County managers use protected class status as a plus factor in employment
decisions.92 Similar to Kaiser’s preference plan, Santa Clara targeted
historical underrepresentation in job classifications but was not remedying

89. Id. at 217. Justice Rehnquist dissented for similar reasons and stated that:
Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and
Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory
language, "uncontradicted" legislative history, and uniform precedent in
concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider race in making
employment decisions . . . .
....
Our task in this case, like any other case involving the construction of a statute,
is to give effect to the intent of Congress. To divine that intent, we traditionally
look first to the words of the statute and, if they are unclear, then to the statute's
legislative history. Finding the desired result hopelessly foreclosed by these
conventional sources, the Court turns to a third source -- the "spirit" of the Act.
But close examination of what the Court proffers as the spirit of the Act reveals
it as the spirit animating the present majority, not the 88th Congress. For if the
spirit of the Act eludes the cold words of the statute itself, it rings out with
unmistakable clarity in the words of the elected representatives who made the
Act law. It is equality.
Id. at 222 and 253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
90. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616 (1987). When Johnson was decided 1987, Justices
O’Connor and Scalia had been conformed to the Court and Justices Burger and Stewart had
retired.
91. Id. at 620-21 (“In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District Board of
Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan (Plan) for the County Transportation
Agency. The Plan implemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been adopted,
declared the County, because ‘mere prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to
remedy the effects of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation
of minorities, women and handicapped persons.’ Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job
classification in which women have been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is
authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant.” (citations omitted)).
92. Id. at 622 (“The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of positions for
minorities or women, but authorized the consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor when
evaluating qualified candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were poorly
represented.”).
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its prior discriminatory practices.93
Subsequent to the plan’s adoption, the County opened a road
dispatcher position.94 Officials had seven qualified candidates to choose
from for a road dispatcher position and ultimately recommended that a
white male (Johnson) receive the job.95 At the same time, a female
employee (Joyce) contacted the County’s Affirmative Action Coordinator
who made a recommendation to the Director that Joyce should receive the
job instead of Johnson.96 The Director chose Joyce and defended his
choice with the following statement: “I tried to look at the whole picture,
the combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, their
test scores, their expertise [sic], their background [sic], affirmative action
matters, things like that . . . . I believe it was a combination of all those."97
After the decision, Johnson filed a Title VII lawsuit claiming that the
Affirmative Action Plan discriminated against him on the basis of sex.98
The Supreme Court looked to the criteria utilized in Weber to analyze
the County’s plan.99 The Court looked for a “‘manifest imbalance’ that

93. Id. at 621 (“In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency noted in its
Plan that women were represented in numbers far less than their proportion of the County
labor force in both the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories. Specifically,
while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor market, they composed only 22.4% of
Agency employees. . . . As for the job classification relevant to this case, none of the 238
Skilled Craft Worker positions was held by a woman. The Plan noted that this
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that women had not traditionally
been employed in these positions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek
training or employment in them because of the limited opportunities that have existed in the
past for them to work in such classifications.”) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 623 (“On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for the
promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agency's Roads Division.”).
95. Id. at 623-24 (describing the job selection process).
96. Id. at 624 (“The Coordinator recommended to the Director of the Agency, James
Graebner, that Joyce be promoted.”).
97. Id. at 625. The Director also considered the evaluations for each candidate, which
stated that:
[B]oth [Joyce] and Johnson were rated as well qualified for the job. The
evaluation of Joyce read: "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of past clerical
experience including 3 1/2 years at West Yard plus almost 5 years as a [road
maintenance worker]." The evaluation of Johnson was as follows: "Well
qualified applicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience plus 11
years of Road Yard Clerk. Has had previous outside Dispatch experience but
was 13 years ago.” [The Director] testified that he did not regard as significant
the fact that Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed by the twoperson board.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. (“Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he had been
denied promotion on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.”).
99. Id. at 627-28 (“The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be guided by
our decision in Weber . . . .”).
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reflected underrepresentation of women in ‘traditionally segregated job
categories.’”100 In searching for such, the Court analyzed the percentage of
women in the company’s workforce as compared to that in the area labor
market or in the general population.101
In concluding that the County’s plan did not violate Title VII, the
Court found that a manifest imbalance in road dispatcher positions did exist
- in fact, none of the 238 Skilled Craft workers in the County were
women.102 This led the Court to the obvious conclusion that women were
underrepresented in this job category.103 The majority opinion in Johnson
found that the County’s affirmative action plan was based on aspirations
and not quotas and, at the same time, that the plan did not unnecessarily
trammel the rights of the County’s male employees.104 Additionally, the

100. Id. at 631.
101. Id. at 631-33 (stating that this proportionality test is appropriate when analyzing
jobs that require no special expertise). When a job requires special expertise, the relevant
comparison is with the percentage of the area’s labor force possessing the requisite
expertise. Id. at 632 (citing Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977) (holding that the proper comparison for a specialized position rests in an analysis of
how the percentage of black teachers in a company’s employ ranks with percentage of
qualified black teachers in the labor force of the surrounding area)).
102. Id. at 636.
103. Id. at 634 (stating that:
“It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursuant to [a County] plan
that directed that sex or race be taken into account for the purpose of remedying
underrepresentation. The [County’s] Plan acknowledged the ‘limited
opportunities that have existed in the past,’ for women to find employment in
certain job classifications ‘where women have not been traditionally employed
in significant numbers.’ As a result, observed the Plan, women were
concentrated in traditionally female jobs in the [County], and represented a
lower percentage in other job classifications than would be expected if such
traditional segregation had not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 ParaProfessionals and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers were women. By
contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Officials and Administrators, 5 of the 58
Professionals, 12 of the 124 Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers,
and 1—who was Joyce—of the 110 Road Maintenance Workers. The Plan
sought to remedy these imbalances through ‘hiring, training and promotion of . .
. women throughout the [County] in all major job classifications where they are
underrepresented.”) (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 635 (stating that the plan did not contain quotas); see also id. at 638 (stating
that the plan did not trammel on the rights of male employees). The following chart lists
each Justice sitting in Johnson and each Justice’s decision in the case:

Case

Justice

Opinion Type

Reasoning

Johnson
v.
Transportation
Agency, Santa

Blackmun

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

CIOCCHETTIFINALIZED_ONE

306

3/31/2010 1:59:33 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:2

majority opinion stated that the purposes of Title VII would be thwarted if
companies were not allowed to institute voluntary affirmative action
plans.105
(3) Diversity can be a compelling interest in higher education—but
not in K-12 education—under the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative action decisions—Gratz
v. Bollinger,106 Grutter v. Bollinger,107 and Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District108—merits a brief mention.109 The

Brennan (opinion)

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

Marshall

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

O’Connor (concur)

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

Powell

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

Rehnquist

Minority

Plan Violates Title VII

Stevens (concur)

Majority

Plan does not Violate
Title VII

Scalia (dissent)

Minority

Plan Violates Title VII

White (dissent)

Minority

Plan Violates Title VII

105. Id. at 630 (following the Court’s rationale from Weber that found that the intent of
Title VII contemplates the idea that companies might create voluntary affirmative action
plans).
106. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
107. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
108. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701.
109. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently
decided a reverse discrimination case in its 2008-2009 term which may impact affirmative
action. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (questioning whether a municipality
may decline to certify an employment examination because the results would lead to more
whites being promoted and potential discrimination charges). In a 93-page decision
(including two concurrences and one dissent) the Supreme Court held that the municipality
in question violated Title VII by declining to certify the employment examination. Id. at
2681 (holding that:
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connection rests in the reasons underlying these education-based preference
plans. In each case, the organization promulgating affirmative action
avoided the Remedial Rationale and relied instead on the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale. Although none of these cases deals directly with
private workplaces, each will likely impact affirmative action arising in this
arena.110 The remainder of this section summarizes how a diversity-based
goal impacted the analysis of the Justices. Part IV analyzes the potential
future impact of these decisions as precedent when diversity-based
workplace preferences are challenged in court.111
In Gratz, the University of Michigan was sued by white applicants for
implementing a voluntary affirmative action plan (in the form of an
admissions policy) that helped determine its incoming class.112 This plan
generated controversy because it awarded minority applicants a
predetermined amount of points specifically for being part of a specific
underrepresented group.113 This plan was not based on prior discrimination
by Michigan;114 instead, Michigan granted preferences in the interest of
obtaining a diverse class.115

“[c]onfronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results—
and threats of a lawsuit either way—the City was required to make a difficult
inquiry. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-impact
violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the
racial disparity in the results.”).
As expected, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas voted in
the majority. Id.
110. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19 (2005) (stating
that answering the question of whether Grutter might impact “the legality of workforce
diversity programs that give an edge in hiring and promotions to members of
underrepresented racial and ethnic groups . . . [requires crossing] both the line between
education and employment and the line between the Constitution and Title VII.”). Estlund
continues by stating that “we have already seen [that]... the emanations of the Supreme
Court's affirmative action decisions are so not easily cabined [by the different arenas].” Id.
111. See, id. at 4 ( “[By] recognizing legitimate non-remedial justifications for
affirmative action in higher education, Grutter may suggest an alternative defense of
affirmative action in employment that better fits both what employers are doing and what
they are proclaiming under the banner of diversity.”).
112. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252 (stating that the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit
claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Section 1981, Section 1983 and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
113. Id. at 278 (concurring in the decision on the part of Justice O’Connor). In fact,
minorities were awarded a significant number of points (20 out of a total of 150 with 100
points generally necessary for admission). Id. The undergraduate admissions policy also
granted a predetermined number of points for other qualifications such as attendance at a
disadvantaged high school or athletic accomplishments. Id.
114. Id. at 268 (stating that Michigan did not rely on the Remedial Rationale).
115. Id. at 257 (stating that the University of Michigan “contended that the [college of
Literature, Science and the Arts] has . . . an interest in the educational benefits that result
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Because the case revolved around state action not involving
employment, the Court analyzed it under the Equal Protection Clause and
not Title VII.116 Racial classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment
require courts to conduct a strict scrutiny review.117 Strict scrutiny
mandates that the party implementing affirmative action: (1) have a
compelling interest in making distinctions based on race and (2) ensure that
the classification plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
interest.118 In Gratz, the majority held that seeking diversity for educational
purposes is a compelling interest but that the awarding of a set number of
points to minority applicants was not a narrowly tailored means to achieve
this interest.119 The awarding of points, the Court held, did not treat each
applicant as an individual or on an individualized basis.120

from having a racially and ethnically diverse student body and that its program is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.”).
116. Id. at 270.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 275.
120. The following chart shows the vote of each Justice in the Gratz case:

Case
Gratz
Bollinger

Justice

Opinion Type

Reasoning

Breyer (concur)

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Ginsburg
(dissent)

Minority

Michigan’s
Constitutional

Plan

Kennedy

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

O’Connor
(concur)

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Rehnquist
(opinion)

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Scalia

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Souter (dissent)

Minority

Michigan’s
Constitutional

Plan

v.

6-3
Higher
Education
Affirmative
Action
Plan
Unconstitutional
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However, the Court reached a different conclusion regarding a similar
higher education affirmative action plan in Grutter.121 The issue revolved
around a voluntary preference plan (also contained in an admissions
policy)122 created by the University of Michigan’s School of Law. As in
Gratz, this Plan was not created to remedy past discrimination.123 Instead,
the plan authorized the use of an applicant’s race124 as a plus factor to
obtain a critical mass of students able to foster educational diversity.125
Importantly, this plan did not allot a predetermined number of points based
on race as in Gratz, but instead allowed for a more individualized
consideration of each candidate.126

Stevens (dissent)

Minority

Michigan’s
Constitutional

Plan

Thomas
(concur)

Majority

Michigan’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

121. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
122. Id. at 312-16 (discussing Michigan’s affirmative action plan). The Michigan Plan
began in 1992 when the Dean of the law school charged a faculty committee with producing
a written admissions policy that encompassed the following goals: (1) to admit a group of
the most capable students (both individually and collectively), (2) to admit individuals with
a strong promise of success in law school and in the practice of law, (3) to admit individuals
who will contribute to the well-being of others and (4) to admit “‘a mix of students with
varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other.’” Id. at
313-14 (citing Michigan’s stated admissions goals). Michigan’s faculty unanimously
approved the committee’s plan and the document became the school’s official admissions
policy. Id. at 315.
123. Id. at 319 (quoting the chairperson of the committee that drafted the admissions
policy, Professor Richard Lempert, who stated that the language of the Policy “did not
purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include students who may bring to the
Law School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the
victims of such discrimination.”). In addition, “Lempert acknowledged that other groups,
such as Asians and Jews, have experienced discrimination, but explained they were not
mentioned in the policy because individuals who are members of those groups were already
being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers.” Id.
124. It is important to note that only some minority groups were given preference by the
plan. Id. at 316 (reiterating Michigan’s commitment to “‘one particular type of diversity,’
that is, ‘racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in
our student body in meaningful numbers.’”).
125. Id. at 311 (stating the issue of the case); see also id. at 330 (stating that Michigan
believed that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students “promotes ‘cross-racial
understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, . . . ‘enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races’” and assists students in what has become a diverse,
global workforce).
126. The plan was based off of Justice Powell’s ruling in Bakke that the creation of a
diverse educational environment can be a compelling governmental interest. See Regents of
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The Supreme Court, in a controversial five-to-four decision,127
affirmed the Sixth Circuit, which validated the constitutionality of the law
school’s plan.128 The majority argued that obtaining a diverse student body
is a compelling governmental interest as it relates to admissions to
institutions of higher public education and that Michigan’s Plan was
narrowly tailored to serve this compelling interest. In so ruling, the Court
stated that remedying past discrimination is not the only compelling

the Univ. of Cal. v. Baake, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (discussing the need to categorically
broaden the search for diversity).
127. The following chart shows the votes of each Justice in the Grutter case:

Justice

Opinion Type

Reasoning

Breyer

Majority

Law
School’s
Constitutional

Plan

Ginsburg (concur)

Majority

Law
School’s
Constitutional

Plan

Kennedy (dissent)

Minority

Law
School’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

O’Connor (opinion)

Majority

Law
School’s
Constitutional

Plan

5-4

Rehnquist (dissent)

Minority

Law
School’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Higher
Education
Affirmative
Action Plan
Constitutional

Scalia (concurring in
part and dissenting
in part)

Minority

Law
School’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Souter

Majority

Law
School’s
Constitutional

Plan

Stevens

Majority

Law
School’s
Constitutional

Plan

Thomas (concurring
in
part
and
dissenting in part)

Minority

Law
School’s
Unconstitutional

Plan

Case

Grutter
Bollinger

v.

128. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003).
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justification allowing for the creation of an affirmative action plan.129 The
majority gave deference to the academic judgment of Michigan as a
university and stated that the ideas of academic freedom, freedom of
speech, and freedom of thought place universities in a “special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”130 In addition, the Court found that the Plan’s
aspiration of a critical mass was not the same as racial balancing or quotas
that were ruled unconstitutional in Bakke.131 Michigan’s Plan was
constitutional because it looked at each applicant as an individual and was
flexible in its approach to race: retaining the ability to use race as a plus
factor in admission decisions, without being forced to award points in a
predetermined, mechanical fashion to underrepresented minority
applicants.132 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion concluded with a
discussion of the idea that all affirmative action plans must be limited in
duration and that Michigan’s Plan should accomplish its goal and end in
twenty-five years.133
Four Justices—Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas—dissented in
Grutter.134 The dissenters agreed with the majority about the use of strict
scrutiny in affirmative action cases involving race, but they disagreed that
Michigan’s Plan was narrowly tailored.135 In fact, the Justices felt that the
129. Id. at 328, 334. The Court claimed that it had not addressed the issue of race in
public education since the Bakke case and that other Supreme Court precedent did not
foreclose diversity as a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 328.
130. Id. at 329.
131. Id. at 334-37.
132. Id. at 337.
133. See id. at 342 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s statement in the majority opinion stating
that:
“[the Court is] mindful, however, that ‘[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination
based on race.’ Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time. This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however
compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed
no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent
justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal
protection principle. We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions
programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a
logical end point. The Law School, too, concedes that all ‘race-conscious
programs must have reasonable durational limits.’”) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
134. Id. at 378.
135. See id. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating:
“I do not believe, however, that the University of Michigan Law School’s . . .
means are narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts. The Law School claims it
must take the steps it does to achieve a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented
minority students. But its actual program bears no relation to this asserted goal.
Stripped of its ‘critical mass’ veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a
naked effort to achieve racial balancing.”) (citation omitted).
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majority’s use of the strict scrutiny test was extremely lenient and that
Michigan’s aspiration of enrolling a critical mass was not shown through
its actual enrollment practices.136 Through this discussion, the dissenters
implied that Michigan’s true goal was to increase the overall enrollment of
black students without paying much concern to other underrepresented
minority groups such as Hispanics and Native Americans.137
Finally, in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,138 the Roberts Court heard its first affirmative action case,
which occurred in the arena of K-12 public education. In this case, a group
of parents in the Seattle and Louisville School Districts challenged racebased preference plans that denied their children the school of their
choice.139 Arguably relying on Grutter, both districts voluntarily created
plans to increase diversity rather than to remedy prior discrimination.140
The five-to-four majority held that these plans violated the Equal
Protection Clause.141 Applying strict scrutiny, Chief Justice Roberts’
136. Id. at 379–81.
137. See id. at 382 (reviewing actual admissions figures showing a drastically lower
enrollment of Hispanic and Native American students).
138. Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 55 U.S.
701 (2007).
139. Id. at 701-09.
140. Id. at 724-25.
141. The following chart shows the votes of each Justice in the Parents Involved case:
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majority opinion struck down both plans as not being narrowly tailored
enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.142

Case

Parents
Involved
in
Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle
Sch.
Dist. No. 1
5-4
K-12
Affirmative
Action
Plan
Unconstitutional

Justice

Opinion Type

Reasoning

Alito

Majority

K-12 Preference
Unconstitutional

Plan

Breyer (Dissent)

Minority

K-12 Preference
Constitutional

Plan

Ginsburg

Minority

K-12 Preference
Constitutional

Plan

Kennedy
(concur)

Majority

K-12 Preference
Unconstitutional

Plan

Roberts
(Opinion)

Majority

K-12 Preference
Unconstitutional

Plan

Scalia

Majority

K-12 Preference
Unconstitutional

Plan

Souter

Minority

K-12 Preference
Constitutional

Plan

Stevens
(dissent)

Minority

K-12 Preference
Constitutional

Plan

Thomas
(Concur)

Majority

K-12 Preference
Unconstitutional

Plan

142. See id. at 734 (quoting the Ninth Circuit that stated, the defendant [Seattle in this
case] “has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes . . . outweigh the cost of
subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely on the color of their
skin”) (citation omitted). The Court was only able to muster a plurality opinion—Justice
Kennedy would not join—declining to determine whether diversity is a compelling interest
at the K-12 level. See id. at 726 (stating that:
“[The] parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact
has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves
intangible socialization benefits. The debate is not one we need to resolve,
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The opinion distinguished the need for diversity in higher education
from the need for diversity in primary and secondary education and refused
to apply Grutter’s reasoning.143 The Chief Justice ended with the strong
statement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”144
Justice Kennedy agreed with the substance of the majority opinion but
filed a concurrence to make clear that he identified a compelling interest in
K-12 diversity and in avoiding racial isolation.145 In fact, Kennedy would
“allow race conscious policies which could include line drawing, new
school placement, and the recruitment of students and faculty without
resorting to strict scrutiny as long as individual students were not subjected
to different treatment on account of race.”146 However, this crucial swing
Justice voted to strike down these specific plans because of their failure to
meet the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny.147 Justice Breyer
penned a dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens—
accusing the majority of violating the legacy of Brown and arguing that
color-blind integration plans have not been effective.148
Part III utilizes this background information and precedent to
introduce the Diversity Spotlight Rationale and analyze three key
components necessary for any diversity-based, voluntary workplace
affirmative action plan to theoretically survive scrutiny by the current
Court.
III. EXAMINING THE DIVERSITY SPOTLIGHT RATIONALE AND ITS KEY
COMPONENTS
Despite walking a tightrope between liability and remediation,
businesses continue to promulgate preference-based affirmative action
plans.149 However, as evidenced by the multitude of amicus briefs filed in
however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the
districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and
social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”).
143. Id. at 724-25.
144. Id. at 747.
145. Id. at 783.
146. Craig L. Jackson, United States Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Term, Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, and a New Direction, 36 CAP. U.L. REV. 511, 554 (2007) (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 783-84.
148. Id. at 788.
149. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Action Plans are Now Part of the Normal
Corporate Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A20 (quoting Alfred W.
Blumrosen—a law professor and former EEOC official—who was discussing the
prominence of affirmative action in the contemporary workplace, and who stated that
“[a]ffirmative action programs are so much a part of the way industry operates today that to
try to de-establish them would create enormous difficulties”).
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Grutter, it appears that many of America’s most prominent businesses have
abandoned the Remedial Rationale as a justification.150
Instead,
contemporary affirmative action programs are justified under the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale.151 This change is far from subtle. As detailed in Part I,
the Supreme Court ruled in Weber152 and Johnson153 that the Remedial
150. This trend is in part evidenced by the multitude of amicus briefs filed in Grutter,
implying that such programs will be created in the future. It is important to note that the
filing of a brief with a court and the actual creation of such a plan based on the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale are two different things. Concerning the latter, some companies tout on
their websites their dedication to increasing diversity within their workforces; however, the
same companies do not go into detail as to the specifics of minority preference programs.
For example, 3M seems to have created a diversity-based, forward-looking affirmative
action policy, which it summarizes briefly on its Website. See 3M, Diversity At 3M:
Recruiting,
http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_US/usdiversity/diversity/3M/recruiting/ (last visited May 31, 2009) (claiming that the company’s
Workforce Diversity Department “provides direction and support to enhance recruitment of
candidates for student and career employment”); see also American Express, Diversity at
Work,
http://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/int/staffing/staffing_diversity_empl_net
works.do?vgnextoid=dc2ccc9c63e00210VgnVCM200000d0faad94RCRD (last visited Oct.
27, 2009) (listing various employee networks active within the company such as the
Hispanic Network, Asian Employee Network and Black Employee Network); American
Express,
Diversity
Recruiting
Events,
http://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/int/amexjobs/amex_jobsspecialevents.do
?vgnextoid=dd984fdc47310210VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD (last visited May 29,
2009) (listing eleven job fairs specifically targeting minority applicants). It is also possible
that the policies mentioned above are merely non-preference-based minority recruitment
options as opposed to preference-based affirmative action plans. Regardless, companies are
placing diversity high on their recruitment priority lists. See, e.g., Jessica Calleja, Diversity
Recruiting, JOBPOSTINGS, http://www.jobpostings.net/articleDetail.cfm?id=251 (last visited
May 31, 2009) (“[As the] American demographic continues to change and the population of
visible minorities continues to grow, companies are discovering it only makes sense to take
advantage of this emerging talent by making diversity recruiting a priority.”).
151. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, and Workplace
Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 200 (2004-05) [hereinafter Diversity Justification]
(“[In] the wake of Grutter it can be anticipated . . . that public as well as private employers
will consider and develop diversity-based justifications for voluntary affirmative action in
their workplaces.”) (footnote omitted).
152. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209
(1979) (“We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the
Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”).
153. Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (stating:
“We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into account as one
factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining that she should be promoted to the
road dispatcher position. The decision to do so was made pursuant to an
affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities
and women in the Agency's work force. Such a plan is fully consistent with
Title VII, for it embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can
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Rationale does not violate the anti-discrimination mandate of Title VII. In
fact, the law allows such benign discrimination as long as employers seek
to remedy prior discrimination in the following ways: (1) institutionally or
(2) in traditionally segregated job categories (as opposed to societal
discrimination more generally).154
On the contrary, forward-looking preferences promulgated under the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale have yet to gain the same level of judicial
approval – at least in the private workplace arena.155 Part III examines the
foundation of this emerging justification. The section moves on to analyze
three key components that should be present in any diversity-based
preference plan to make it compliant with the precedent detailed in Part II.
Part IV concludes with an evaluation of whether just such a preference plan
based on the DSR and containing these three key components is likely to
survive Title VII scrutiny by a conservative-leaning Supreme Court.
A. The Diversity Spotlight Rationale: A Big Picture Perspective
The claim that diversity is an important component of a company’s
workforce is nothing new.156 In fact, businesses have been making
make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.”).
154. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (considering a
case of race-based layoffs of teachers employed by a public school system and stating that
“[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy”); see also Diversity Justification, supra note 151, at 232 (stating that:
“[As] a matter of doctrine, Grutter's constitutional analysis did not apply to the
now well-settled position that employers covered by Title VII may engage in
voluntary affirmative action as a means of integrating traditionally segregated
job categories and addressing manifest imbalances in particular occupations.
Public and private employer affirmative action programs considering the race,
sex, and other characteristics of employees for the purpose of remedying such
under representations are not proscribed by the statute so long as employers
comply with the prongs and standards set out in Weber and Johnson.”).
155. See, e.g., David A. Harvey, A Preference for Equality: Seeking the Benefits of
Diversity Outside the Educational Context, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 55, 56 (2007) (“Diversity, as a
compelling governmental interest, has only been constitutionally approved for a relatively
brief period of an individual's life - during his or her formal education - and then only
through preferential race-based classifications.”). Recall that Grutter did allow preferences
to be granted under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale in the public higher education context
as the University of Michigan did not have a history of prior racial discrimination. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that “the Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.”).
156. See, e.g., Taxman v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996)
(discussing a case where an employer who was forced to terminate one employee from its
teaching staff terminated a white employee over an equally qualified black employee for the
sake of diversity).
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employment decisions based on diversity for decades.157 However, the
overt proclamation that—even in the absence of prior discrimination—an
employer will grant preferences to obtain a diverse workforce gained
national prominence only recently in the Grutter case.158 In Grutter, over
eighty prominent American businesses filed amici curiae briefs in favor of
Michigan’s plan,159 advocated for judicial acceptance of the school’s
forward-looking approach, and thereby, presented their version of the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale.160 This massive support for Michigan’s

157. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents at 1-2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter 3M
Amici Brief] (stating that the Fortune 500 companies filing this brief:
“have devoted substantial financial and human resources to create and maintain
a diverse workforce. These extensive efforts are part of the very fabric of [these
companies’] cultures, are implemented and overseen by senior managers, and
are supported at the highest levels. In addition, many of [these companies]
pursue a variety of endeavors to support minority students in higher education,
including . . . summer internship opportunities, recruiting and mentoring . . .”).
158. See, e.g., John E. Higgins, Grutter and Gratz Decisions Underscore Pro-Diversity
Trends In Schools and Businesses, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 32 (2004) (“[The] long-term
consequences of [the Grutter decision] are yet to be determined, but talk of ‘diversity’ in all
its many stripes, shapes, colors and hues has replaced talk about ‘affirmative action’ in the
new, more global parlance of the Court, in our nation’s schools, and in businesses across the
country.”).
159. An amicus curiae (literally “friend of the court”) brief is a filing with the Supreme
Court – made by an individual or institution who is not a party to the case – which makes an
argument supporting one side or one issue in a case pending before the Court. See, e.g.,
Amicus Curiae, TECH. L.J., http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/amicus.htm (last
visited May 31, 2009) (presenting information from different sources which describe the
role of amicus curiae). The arguments made in these briefs often deal with big-picture,
public policy issues instead of the factual record or judicial decision-making of the
particular case. Amici curiae briefs allow the Court to hear how a larger segment of society
feels about the issue in a particular case in a way that the individual litigants are likely
barred from raising as being too far from the facts. The Supreme Court encourages the
filing of such briefs if they are helpful in aiding the Court to make a decision. See SUP. CT.
R. 37(1) (stating which briefs will be acceptable to the Court). The most common filers of
amici briefs are various advocacy groups who are not parties to the litigation at hand.
160. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (showing that the following
businesses assisted in filing this brief in support of Michigan):
(1)
3M
(6)
American
Airlines
(11)
Baxter
Healthcare

(2)
Abbott
Laboratories
(7)
American
Express
(12)
Boeing

(3)
Alcoa

(4)
Alliant Energy

(5)
Altria
Group

(8)
Amgen

(9)
Ashland

(10)
Bank One

(14)
Chevron Texaco

(15)
CocaCola

(13)
Charter
Financial

One
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(16)
Coca-Cola
Enterprises
(21)
Eastman
Kodak

(17)
DaimlerChrysl
er

(18)
Deloitte Consulting

(19)
Deloitte & Touche

(20)
Dow
Chemical

(22)
Eaton

(23)
Eli Lilly

(24)
Ernst & Young

(25)
Exelon

(26)
Fannie
Mae

(27)
General
Dynamics

(28)
General Electric

(29)
General Mills

(31)
Harris
Bankcorp

(32)
HewlettPackard

(33)
Illinois Tool Works

(34)
Intel

(37)
Kellogg

(38)
KPMG Int'l

(39)
Kraft Foods

(40)
Lockheed
Martin

(42)
Medtronic

(43)
Merck

(44)
Microsoft

(45)
Mitsubish
i Motors

(47)
Nationwide
Mutual Ins.

(48)
NetCom Solutions

(49)
Nike

(52)
PepsiCo

(53)
Pfizer

(54)
PPG Industries

(57)
Reebok

(58)
Sara Lee

(59)
Schering-Plough

(60)
Shell Oil

(62)
Sterling
Financial

(63)
United Airlines

(64)
Whirlpool

(65)
Xerox

(36)
Kaiser Fou
nd. Health
Plan
(41)
Lucent
Technolog
ies
(46)
MSC.Soft
ware
(51)
Pepsi
Bottling
Group
(56)
Procter &
Gamble
(61)
Steelcase

(30)
John
Hancock
Fin. Svs.
(35)
Johnson
&
Johnson

(50)
Northrop
Grumman
(55)
Pricewate
rhouseCo
opers

“Collectively, [the companies joining the 3M Amici Brief] have annual revenues well over a
trillion dollars and hire thousands of graduates of the University of Michigan and other
major public universities.” Id. In addition to the sixty-five companies joining the 3M Amici
Brief, General Motors filed a separate amici brief and eighteen media companies joined
together to file a separate brief in support of Michigan’s position. See Brief of General
Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter General Motors Amici Brief]
(showing that General Motors supported Michigan’s position); Brief of Amici Curiae Media
Companies in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02241, 02-516) [hereinafter Media Companies Amici Brief] (showing that the following
eighteen media companies supported Michigan’s position):
(1)
Banks
Broadcasting

(2)
Brunson
Communications

(3)
ChaseCom

(4)
El
Dorado
Communications
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policy stands in stark contrast to the fifteen briefs filed on behalf of Barbara
Grutter and against the Michigan affirmative action Plan.161
The Diversity Spotlight Rationale is a straightforward way of stating
that businesses desire workforce diversity merely for the sake of diversity.
No emphasis is placed on making up for past wrongs against particular
minority groups – whether institutional or societal.162 Business proponents
of this rationale would not deny past discrimination, but prefer instead to
analyze how a diverse workforce can impact their future bottom-line.163

(5)
Emmis
Communications
(9)
K-B
Prime
Media
(13)
Northpoint
Technology
(17)
Waters
Broadcasting

(6)
Essence Communication
Pts.

(7)
Granite Broadcasting

(10)
La Favorita Broadcasting

(11)
LIN-Television

(14)
Radio One

(15)
Stop 26-Riverbend

(8)
Hispanic
Broadcasting
(12)
Mariner
Broadcasters
(16)
Susquehanna
Radio

(18)
Yankees Entertainment & Sports Network

161. University of Michigan: Admissions Lawsuits, Amicus Briefs Filed with the U.S.
Supreme
Court
in
Grutter
v.
Bollinger,
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/ (last visited May 31,
2009) (linking to each of the fifteen briefs from amici curiae supporting Barbara Grutter and
urging reversal):
(1)
State
Florida

of

(5)
Center
for
New
Black
Leadership
(9)
National
Association of
Scholars
(13)
United States

(2)
Asian American Legal
Fdn.

(3)
Center for Equal Opportunity

(6)
Center
for
Advancement
Capitalism

(7)
Claremont Institute Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence

(10)
Pacific
Foundation
(14)
Ward Connerly

the
of

Legal

(11)
Law Professors

(4)
Center for
Individual
Freedom
(8)
Michigan
Association
of Scholars
(12)
Reason
Foundation

(15)
Cato Institute

162. In fact, the words “remedial,” “remediation,” or “societal discrimination” are no
where mentioned in the entire 3M Amici Brief. The word discrimination only occurs once.
See 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 7 (stating the benefits of diversity).
163. See 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 4 (quoting Justice Powell who discussed
such an emphasis on the future when he stated that “it is not too much to say that the
‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores
of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”) (citations omitted).
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They make the argument that future sustainability as a business entity in an
ever-globalizing marketplace depends on the attainment of a diverse
workforce.164 In summary, minority preference plans under the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale are:
1. Forward-looking and non-remedial in nature:
The Diversity Spotlight Rationale is “forward-looking; it is
decidedly not a remedial argument. It is about making a better
future, and not about making up for the sins of the past.”165 In
this sense, utilization of the DSR is a relief for employers.
Executives are no longer forced to collect information about prior
institutional discrimination in order to justify preference plans as
remedial.166 In the past, evidence of such discrimination was
discoverable and available as EXHIBIT A in a Title VII
discrimination lawsuit against the company. Under the DSR,
employers are free to look into the future and ponder how
diversity and exposure to diverse people may benefit future
leaders, executives, etc. On the other hand, this type of nonremedial affirmative action is relatively untested in the private
workplace arena and is sure to generate reverse discrimination
lawsuits as have been litigated in the educational arena.167 Part
164. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 154, at 1 (stating:
“[The] existence of racial and ethnic diversity in institutions of higher education
is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and maintain a diverse workforce, and to
employ individuals of all backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a
diverse environment. As explained in this brief, such a workforce is important
to amici’s continued success in the global marketplace.”).
165. Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work, Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L., 1, 14 (2005).
166. This evidence-gathering to justify a remedial affirmative action plan was
problematic under the Remedial Rationale.
See, e.g., Jerome L. Epstein, Comment,
Walking a Tightrope Without a Net: Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans After Weber, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 457, 474 (1986) (stating:
“[To] immunize itself against a discrimination suit by a nonminority plaintiff,
an employer that has enacted an affirmative action plan must satisfy Weber’s
requirement that the plan be designed to correct ‘manifest racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories.’ Although the employer bears the
burden of establishing the validity of its race-conscious plan, it is clear from the
Weber Court's rejection of the Fifth Circuit majority and dissenting opinions
that the employer cannot be required to establish its own actual past
discrimination or arguable violations of Title VII.”) (citations omitted).
See also Estlund, supra note 162, at 14 (“[F]ew employers have been willing either to put on
a remedial case implying their own responsibility for the underrepresentation of people of
color in their ranks.”).
167. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241) (discussing the merits of the lawsuit and stating that the “Law School . . .
admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions. It justifies this use of
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IV discusses just how such a lawsuit against a private employer
implementing a diversity-based plan might fare in front of the
current Supreme Court.
2. Based on diversity in terms of ethnicity, race and color:
The term diversity as used in the Diversity Spotlight Rationale
generally refers to ethnicity, race, and color as opposed to gender,
affinity, economic, experiential, or other types of characteristics
that differentiate individuals from one another. The 3M Amici
Brief refers only to “ethnic and racial diversity” in its argument in
favor of Michigan’s preference plan.168 Similarly, the General
Motors Amici Brief disclaims that any “ruling proscribing the
consideration of race and ethnicity in admissions decisions likely
would dramatically reduce diversity at our Nation’s top
institutions.”169 This is a controversial position that might rile a
few of the current Supreme Court Justices who abhor preferences
based on such immutable traits.170
3. Voluntary as opposed to court ordered or promulgated to
prevent future litigation:
Finally, affirmative action under the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale is voluntary. This means that companies choose to
grant preferences without being compelled to do so via a court
order. Obviously, companies that have not discriminated in the
past do not face legal liability and potential court-mandated
affirmative action. Section 703(j) of Title VII touches on
whether such voluntary affirmative action is allowed. This
section states that nothing in the statute “shall be interpreted to
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment” to any
group based on percentages of such group employed by the

race on one ground only: that it serves a ‘compelling interest in achieving diversity among
its student body.’”) (citations omitted).
168. 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (“[The] existence of racial and ethnic diversity
in institutions of higher education is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and maintain a diverse
workforce, and to employ individuals of all backgrounds who have been educated and
trained in a diverse environment”) (emphasis added).
169. General Motors Amici Brief, supra note 160, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[The] Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”); id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[The] Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the
basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.”).
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employer.171 This section makes it very clear that Title VII does
not require affirmative action. However, the majority in Weber
distinguished required affirmative action from voluntary
affirmative action and ruled that Title VII does not, by its express
language, ban voluntarily implemented preference plans.172
In addition to defining the concept of the Diversity Spotlight Rationale
accurately, it is important to cover the benefits of such plans from an
employer’s standpoint. Employer-proponents of DSR claim that such
programs create:
1)A diverse workforce necessary to compete and innovate in the
global economy (The Global Economy Focus):
The rationale underlying the Global Economy focus is that the
twenty-first century workplace is increasingly globalized and
therefore, increasingly diverse. 3M’s brief in Grutter reiterated
this point in stating that the nature of American business is
changing. “Most of the [companies supporting the DSR] are
truly international companies, and virtually all are becoming so . .
. they operate and compete in a global environment, serving and
working with people and cultures of all kinds.”173 Additionally,
business-proponents of the DSR claim that they must be able to
hire, train, and promote a diverse workforce—including positions
in top management—in order to compete effectively in the global
economy. 3M reiterated this Global Economy Focus in its
Grutter amici brief:
Because our population is diverse, and because of the
increasingly global reach of American business, the skills and
training needed to succeed in business today demand exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. Employees
at every level of an organization must be able to work effectively
with people who are different from themselves. Amici need the
talent and creativity of a workforce that is as diverse as the world
around it.174
Proponents of the DSR also claim that America itself is

171. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j)(2006).
172. See United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206
(1979) (reasoning that section 703(j) "does not state that ‘nothing in Title VII shall be
interpreted to permit’ voluntary affirmative action efforts to correct racial imbalances. The
natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action.”).
173. 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 6-7.
174. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).

CIOCCHETTIFINALIZED_ONE

2010]

3/31/2010 1:59:33 AM

FRONTIER OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

323

becoming more diverse.175 They claim that projections show that
Asians, Blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans will comprise
47% of the American population by the year 2050.176 With such
statistics in mind, proponents argue that they need a diverse
workforce not only to succeed globally but also to thrive
nationally.
2)A Diverse culture where new and innovative ideas can flourish
(The Diversity of Ideas focus):
Proponents of the DSR also claim that new and innovative ideas
are more likely to flourish in a workforce filled with diverse
employees. The idea is that “a diverse group of individuals
educated in a cross-cultural environment has the ability to
facilitate unique and creative approaches to problem-solving
arising from the integration of different perspectives.”177 While
some of this exposure should come at the educational level, other
parts will stem from the presence of a diverse workforce. In
addition, “individuals who have been educated in a diverse
setting are likely to contribute to a positive work environment by
decreasing incidents of discrimination and stereotyping.”178
3)A diverse sales-force satisfying to customers (The Customer
Preferences Focus):
The third focus revolves around the argument that diversity is
becoming ever more important in the twenty-first century global
workplace itself. The idea is that new employees—including
novice managers—must understand how to deal with cultural
differences that exist in their client, co-worker, and managerial
relationships. The Customer Preferences Focus argues that
diverse individuals “are better able to develop products and
services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to market
offerings in ways that appeal to those consumers.”179 In addition,
“a racially diverse group of managers with cross-cultural
experience is better able to work with business partners,
employees, and clientele in the United States and around the
world.”180
Finally, it is important to note that the prominent companies claiming
an interest in Michigan’s diversity-based preference plan also have a partial
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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conflict of interest. Every year, such businesses commit great resources
and recruitment efforts towards Michigan and other elite schools
throughout the country.181 According to these employers, much of their
recruitment efforts revolve around selecting students who have been
immersed in diverse educational environments.182
As mentioned
previously, these businesses tie their future economic successes, at least
partially, to the ability of the nation’s educational institutions to train
students to handle a diverse environment.
B. Three Key Components of a Plan under the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale
Because the Diversity Spotlight Rationale was approved in Grutter—
albeit narrowly within the public higher education arena—businesses such
as 3M were confident that a similar rationale might be allowed in the
private sector workplace. Perhaps the best chance that these businesses
have to insulate their diversity-based plans from the scrutiny of an antiaffirmative action Court is to consider precedent from the key affirmative
action cases analyzed in Part I. This final section of Part III will utilize this
case law to identify key components of any plan promulgated under the
DSR. Accordingly, plans enacted under the DSR:
1. Must be of limited duration and designed to attain rather than
maintain a diverse workforce. In general, a foundational precept
of affirmative action is that it will end when discrimination
disappears. In Grutter, the University of Michigan argued that it
would “like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions
formula” and that it would “terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable.”183 Setting a specific
end date may not be necessary when the plan clearly states that
its intent is to attain, rather than maintain, a diverse workforce.
In Johnson, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan without a
concrete end date, because it was enacted to attain rather than

181. See, e.g., id. at 8 (stating:
“What is critical to[prominent companies] is that the leading colleges,
universities and graduate schools from which they recruit and hire their
employees be diverse, and consist of the most qualified and talented diverse
students as is possible. Universities historically have been responsive to the
needs of business and other professions, developing an extraordinary talent pool
upon which [these businesses] and others may draw.”).
182. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (“[A]mici are global businesses that
recruit at the University of Michigan or similar leading institutions of higher education. . . .
[Such businesses] have a vital interest in who is admitted to our nation's colleges and
universities, and what kind of education and training those students receive.”).
183. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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maintain a diverse workforce.184 With this in mind, business
proponents of the DSR would be ill-served by creating any
diversity-based preference plan without acknowledging this
precedent. For timeframe purposes, an appropriate duration is
likely less than or equal to the twenty-five-year period approved
by the majority in Grutter.185 It would be even more beneficial to
define diversity more broadly than just race and ethnicity.186
Proponents of the DSR, however, have not chosen such a broad
approach in the past.
Both affirmative action proponents and opponents would agree
that diverse workforces are a benefit to society. The difference
occurs with how such workforces are attained. At the end of the
“attainment” period, the hope is that the racism that does exist in
America will diminish, and that maintaining a diverse workforce
can be achieved solely on a merit basis.
2. Must require individualized consideration of applicants and
employees. The key to Michigan’s success in Grutter stemmed
from the fact that each applicant received individualized
consideration.187 The opposite of that is a quota or a set-aside

184. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640 (stating:
“[S]ubstantial evidence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moderate,
gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its work force, one which
establishes realistic guidance for employment decisions, and which visits
minimal intrusion on the legitimate expectations of other employees. Given this
fact, as well as the Agency's express commitment to ‘attain’ a balanced
workforce, there is ample assurance that the Agency does not seek to use its
Plan to ‘maintain’ a permanent racial and sexual balance.”).
185. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“[The majority] expect[s] that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today.”).
186. See Jonathan A. Segal, Diversity: Direct or Disguised? Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Don't Resolve Whether and When You Can Focus on Race in Hiring Decisions,
H.R. MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 123, 127, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/publicadministration/administration-human/664553-1.html [hereinafter Diversity] (stating:
”In upholding the [University of Michigan Law School’s] affirmative action
plan, Justice O'Connor weighed heavily the fact that diversity was not limited to
race and ethnicity but also included non-EEO factors. As a result, employers
should define diversity broadly to include not only EEO factors but also nonEEO factors such as experiences, education and interests.”).
187. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309 (stating:
“The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy, either de
jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single ‘soft’
variable.”).
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system where applicants cannot compete for certain positions.
Lack of such consideration was the downfall of the affirmative
action plans in McDonald,188 Bakke,189 Gratz,190 and Parents
Involved.191 Therefore, any preference plan promulgated under
the DSR cannot include quotas, set-asides, or similar
mechanisms. Instead, such plan can consider the diversity of
employees or applicants as plus factors in any employment or
admissions decision. This might bring the plan more within the
Grutter framework approved by the Court.
3. Must not unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minority
employees and applicants.
Affirmative action plans can
preference minorities but only to a certain extent. Case law will
allow race or ethnicity to be used as a plus factor but limits
preference plans from “unnecessarily trammeling the rights of
white applicants or employees.192 A recent Third Circuit decision
struck down a voluntary affirmative action plan, in part, because
188. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282-83 (stating:
“Fairly read, the complaint asserted that petitioners were discharged for their
alleged participation in a misappropriation of cargo entrusted to Santa Fe, but
that a fellow employee, likewise implicated, was not so disciplined, and that the
reason for the discrepancy in discipline was that the favored employee is Negro
while petitioners are white.”).
189. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (stating:
“[I]t is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an
explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells
applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded
from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how
strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own
potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special
admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.”).
190. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274 (stating:
“The bulk of admissions decisions are executed based on selection index score
parameters set by the [admissions committee administering the affirmative
action policy]. . . . Additionally, this individualized review is only provided
after admissions counselors automatically distribute the University's version of
a ‘plus’ that makes race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority applicant.”).
191. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 273 (“Like the University of Michigan
undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, the plans here ‘do not provide for a meaningful
individualized review of applicants’ but instead rely on racial classifications in a
‘nonindividualized, mechanical’ way.”) (citations omitted).
192. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[The affirmative action plan in question] does not
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees. Nor does the plan
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees . . . .) (citations omitted).
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it unnecessarily interfered with the rights of a white employee
who was terminated in lieu of an equally qualified black
employee.193 Therefore, preferences promulgated under the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale cannot lead to: (1) the elimination
of a white employee’s position, or (2) the restriction of
employment opportunities for white applicants.194 Preferences
can lead to the denial of a particular promotion or other similar
consequences that are less serious than a termination or
immovable ceiling on advancement.
The incorporation of these three key components into a voluntary
affirmative action plan will not guarantee success at the Supreme Court.
However, omitting any of these elements is the death knell for any plan
under the DSR. The final substantive section of this paper evaluates
whether an affirmative action plan promulgated under the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale, and contains each of the three components, is likely to
withstand a Title VII challenge under a conservative-leaning Supreme
Court.
IV. THE DIVERSITY SPOTLIGHT RATIONALE BEFORE THE ROBERTS
COURT
Today’s Supreme Court is proving to be more conservative than the
Rehnquist Court, which decided Grutter in 2003.195 Generally, the Justices

193. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563-64 (3d Cir.
1996) (stating:
“The Board admits that it did not act to remedy the effects of past employment
discrimination. The parties have stipulated that neither the Board's adoption of
its affirmative action policy nor its subsequent decision to apply it in choosing
between Taxman and Williams was intended to remedy the results of any prior
discrimination or identified underrepresentation of Blacks within the Piscataway
School District's teacher workforce as a whole. Nor does the Board contend
that its action here was directed at remedying any de jure or de facto
segregation.”).
194. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white employees.”).
195. See Edward Lazarus, Under John Roberts, Court Re-Rights Itself, WASH. POST, July
1, 2007, at B1 (“Cumulatively, the court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. announced
itself as even more conservative than William H. Rehnquist's court, which, from 1986 to
2005, undercut many of the progressive initiatives from Earl Warren's era.”); Nina
Totenberg, Supreme Court More Conservative, Fragmented, NPR, July 4, 2006, available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5531678 (“For the first time in 11
years, the Supreme Court had a new membership, a new ideological makeup, and a new
chief justice . . . . With the departure of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the arrivals of
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, the court shifted to the right, as
expected.”).
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of the Roberts Court are aligned in three quite distinct camps.196 The
conservative block is made up of Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin
Scalia, Samuel Alito, and Chief Justice John Roberts.197 The liberal block
is made up of Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, retiring
Justice David Souter, and Steven Breyer.198 Although no one can predict
future political alliances on the Court, it appears likely that Souter’s likely
replacement, Justice Sonia Sotomayer,199 will join this liberal block rather
than create a one-Justice, liberal-leaning swing vote.200 The third camp-–
196. See Editorial, The Roberts Court Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at 11, 11
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/opinion/30sun1.html (“There are three
hardened camps: four very conservative justices, four liberals, and a moderate conservative,
Justice Anthony Kennedy, hovering in between.”).
197. See id. (“[I]n reality Chief Justice Roberts quickly settled into a bloc with his fellow
conservatives Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”); Daphne Eviatar, Next
President to Reshape Court, WASH. INDEP., Sept. 12, 2008, available at
http://washingtonindependent.com/5745/next-president-to-reshape-supreme%20court (“If
you add one more Scalia or Thomas or Roberts or Alito to this bench, you’ve got a very
hard 5-person conservative majority.”).
198. See Maria Godoy, Parsing the High Court’s Ruling on Race and Schools, NPR,
June 28, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11659428
(discussing the votes in Parents Involved and stating that “Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a
dissent that was joined by the court's three other liberal justices [Stevens, Ginsburg and
Souter]”).
199. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in
Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayer to the United States Supreme Court, White House, May
26, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-thePresident-in-Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court/
(“After completing this exhaustive process [of searching for a nominee to replace Justice
Souter], I have decided to nominate an inspiring woman who I believe will make a great
justice: Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the great state of New York.”).
200. See Jess Bravin and Nathan Koppel, Record Shows Rulings Within Liberal
ST.
J.,
May
27,
2009,
Mainstream,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338260937756559.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (stating:
“Judge Sonia Sotomayor has built a record on such issues as civil rights and
employment law that puts her within the mainstream of Democratic judicial
appointees. . . . Judge Sotomayor would be succeeding Justice David Souter,
generally a liberal vote on social issues, and her selection isn't likely to change
the outcome on cases where the Supreme Court typically splits 5-4.”).
But see Kevin Russell, Where Would Justice Souter’s Replacement Make a Difference?
Part I, SCOTUSBLOG, May 27, 2009, [hereinafter Difference Part I] available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/where-would-justice-souter%e2%80%99s-replacementmake-a-difference-part-i/#more-9642 (analyzing recent cases “where it is at least possible
that [Justice Souter’s] likely successor, Judge Sotomayor, might vote differently”). Justice
Souter has proven to be a reliable liberal vote. In fact, since Justice Alito joined the Court
for the 2005 term, Justice Souter has only joined the current conservative majority seven
times even though he was appointed by a conservative president. See Kevin Russell, Where
Would Justice Souter’s Replacement Make a Difference? Part II, SCOTUSBLOG, May 29,
2009,
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/where-would-justicesouter%E2%80%99s-replacement-make-a-difference-part-ii/ (stating that there have been
seven cases since 2005 where Justice Souter sided with Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
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one best categorized as conservative-leaning-–is composed of Justice
Anthony Kennedy.201 Statistics from the 2007 term show that nineteen
cases produced split five to four decisions on political lines; Justice
Kennedy sided with the conservative
At the same time, the Court is clearly becoming more ideologically
divided. While the “Rehnquist Court had its share of divided rulings . . .
the new conservative ascendancy has prompted a striking reaction from the
dissenting liberals, John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen Breyer.”202 These days, members of the liberal block are: (1)
filing unified dissenting opinions and (2) bucking the tradition of merely
filing dissents and, instead, reading their opinions aloud from the bench.203
This bitter divide has become prominent in the affirmative action arena, as
well, stemming most recently from the controversial five to four decision in
the Parents Involved case.204
Ginsburg, Kenney, and Alito). It is also fair to assume that the Obama Administration will
nominate an appointee at least as liberal as Souter had become upon his retirement. See
Difference Part I (“One would predicate that—at least on hot-button issues, like abortion
and affirmative action—the President would not have nominated Judge Sotomayor unless he
were fairly confident that she would vote consistently with Justice Souter’s liberal-leaning
record.”). It appears very likely that a liberal nominee will take Justice Souter’s seat on the
Court for the 2009-2010 term.
201. See Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself - Many 5 to 4
Decisions Reflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25,
2007,
at
A3,
A3,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/24/AR2007062401367.html (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the
only member of the court to be in the majority in all 16 of this term's 5 to 4 decisions, has
sided more consistently with conservatives in recently announced cases.”); Laura SmithSpark, US Supreme Court’s Swing to the Right, BBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7021922.stm (discussing the current Court’s swing to
the right and stating that:
“[the] [k]ey to that will be the actions of Justice Anthony Kennedy, most often
the swing voter on the court. In the 2006 session, of 19 cases that divided 5-4
along ideological lines, the conservative block won 13 and the liberal block six and almost every time, Mr. Kennedy's was the deciding vote.”);
Jeffrey Toobin, Editorial, Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35, 35, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2007/06/25/070625taco_talk_toobin [hereinafter
Five to Four] (“Kennedy holds the balance of power in the Roberts Court, much the way
Sandra Day O’Connor did in the Rehnquist years. Kennedy is more conservative than
O’Connor, so the Court is, too.”).
202. Five to Four, supra note 201, at 36.
203. See, e.g., Roberts Barnes, Supreme Court Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June
25,
2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062501047.html (“[The] liberal justices have
responded in unified dissents to amplify their unhappiness . . . . And the term may well be
remembered for the normally modest Ginsburg's decision to buck tradition and read dissents
twice from the bench.”).
204. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Divided Court Rejects School Diversity Plans, CNN, June 28,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/28/scotus.race/index.html (“[A] bitterly divided
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A. Changes on the Court and the Potential Impact on Affirmative Action
At the end of the day, the replacement of conservative Chief Justice
William Rehnquist with conservative Chief Justice John Roberts did not
alter the Court’s stance on affirmative action. Both Rehnquist and Roberts
issued opinions firmly against the practice, especially with preferences
justified by something akin to the Diversity Spotlight Rationale.205 A more
important change—the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to replace
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—has likely decreased support on the Court
for affirmative action. As discussed in Part II, Justice O’Connor proved to
be the pivotal fifth vote in the Grutter decision.206 It was O’Connor’s
opinion that allowed the forward-looking use of preferences to foster a
diverse student body. The evidence indicates that Justice Alito would not
have voted on O’Connor’s side in Grutter. For example, prominent interest
groups challenged Alito’s nomination stating that the:
[M]ost recent claim against Judge Alito is that his advocacy
record before the Supreme Court during his tenure in the Reaganadministration solicitor general’s office shows that he’s to the
extreme right of Justice O’Connor, particularly on matters
U.S. Supreme Court . . . issued what is likely to be a landmark opinion - ruling that race
cannot be a factor in the assignment of children to public schools.”). As discussed in Part I,
the conservative block plus Justice Kennedy voted to strike down the plan. The liberal block
would have upheld it. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. District No.
1, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908 (last visited May 29,
2009) (showing the votes of the Justices in this case in pictorial form).
205. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing
Michigan’s non-remedial affirmative action plan and stating that:
“I agree with the Court that, ‘in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible,’ the government must ensure that its means are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. I do not believe,
however, that the University of Michigan Law School's . . . means are narrowly
tailored to the interest it asserts. The Law School claims it must take the steps it
does to achieve a "'critical mass'" of underrepresented minority students. But its
actual program bears no relation to this asserted goal. Stripped of its "critical
mass" veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve
racial balancing.”);
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (discussing a non-remedial affirmative action plan and
stating that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.”).
206. Justice O’Connor provided the swing vote when she joined the liberal block of the
Court to form a majority in Grutter. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/ (showing the votes of the
Justices in this case in pictorial form and indicating that Justice O’Connor voted in favor of
the diversity-based, voluntary affirmative action plan). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003), OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_516/ (showing that
Justice O’Connor voted with the conservative majority in striking down the forwardlooking, voluntary affirmative action plan in Gratz).
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pertaining to affirmative action. For example, People for the
American Way declares “Alito’s record strongly suggests that if
he had been on the Court instead of O’Connor, affirmative action
by government institutions would have been completely
prohibited instead of being preserved.” The NAACP Legal
Defense Fund maintains that “During [Justice O’Connor’s] long
tenure on the Court, she has cast significant votes in many
decisions to uphold affirmative action.” And the National
Congress of Black Women contends that “If he is confirmed to
replace Justice O’Connor, Judge Alito will almost certainly,
based upon his past performance, shift the current 5-4 balance on
the court on affirmative action.”207
This evidence indicates that the Alito-for-O’Connor substitution is
material - at least pertaining to affirmative action. In fact, the predictions
made below would likely be very different with O’Connor still on the
Court. There is evidence from her Grutter opinion that she might have
voted to extend the majority’s reasoning into the private workplace arena.
In Grutter, O’Connor made it a point to “dispel the notion that the Law
School's argument has been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by
our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke. It is true that some
language in those opinions might be read to suggest that remedying past
discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based
governmental action . . . . But we have never held that the only
governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination.”208 To make this leap from government action to private,
voluntary preferences, O’Connor might have argued that the scrutiny
required by the Fourteenth Amendment is less rigid under Title VII and
that the Court should defer to the expertise of the executives promulgating
DSR plans.209 She might then have picked up on Justice Brennan’s
reasoning in Weber and claimed that nothing in Title VII states that the
Remedial Rationale is the only legal justification for preferences.210 As
interesting as this tangent is, however, the remaining sections of this paper
will deal with the Court as it is currently composed.
B. The Diversity Spotlight Rationale before the Current Supreme Court
The following analysis predicts the likely decision of a conservative207. Peter Kirsanow, Alito Accuracy, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2006,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kirsanow200601060712.asp.
208. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
209. See id. (stating also that the “Law School's educational judgment that such diversity
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
210. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[The majority] need not today define in detail the line of
demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.”).
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leaning Supreme Court (minus O’Connor, plus Alito) when confronted
with a diversity-based preference plan under the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale. More specifically, the goal is to predict how each Justice might
analyze a voluntary affirmative action plan crafted by a private company
for the sole purpose of attaining a diverse workforce. The discussion
assumes that: (1) such a plan will be evaluated under the history and
precedent analyzed in Part I and (2) the positions of the Justices have not
materially changed since their last affirmative action decisions and public
comments on the topic.
(1) The Liberal Block
The Justices of the liberal block would likely uphold a preferencebased plan under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale against a Title VII
challenge. This section discusses the rationale for each of the four Justices
included in this camp.
Since joining the Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg has been proaffirmative action, whether the type promoted by the government under the
Remedial Rationale in Adarand or the Diversity Spotlight Rationale in
Gratz, Grutter, and Parents Involved. Ginsburg’s passion about the topic
led her to pen separate dissents in two of the three cases where the Court
struck down an affirmative action plan on her watch. She did so in
Adarand rather mildly, suggesting that the Court defer to Congress’
institutional competence to overcome the discrimination of the past and
stating that:
The divisions in this difficult case should not obscure the Court's
recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's
acknowledgment of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not
only to end discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's
lingering effects . . . . Those effects, reflective of a system of
racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces,
markets, and neighborhoods.”211
She did so in Gratz more forcefully, focusing on the theme of
continuing and persistent racial discrimination in America and stating the
following:
[Educational institutions are not barred from any and all
consideration of race when making admissions decisions . . . .
[The Court’s] insistence on "consistency," would be fitting were
our Nation free of the vestiges of rank discrimination long
reinforced by law. . . . But we are not far distant from an overtly
discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned
211. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273 (citations omitted).
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inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and
schools.”212
Justice Ginsburg more easily accepts the “benign” discrimination
promoted by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale as long as it does not
“trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly
with legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred groups.”213 She is
also likely to defer to the expertise of the executives promulgating the plans
as she did in Adarand. As for race-based preferences outside of a remedial
context, while on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
Ginsburg stated, “[f]urther, in his separate opinion in Croson, Justice
Stevens reasoned, and I agree, that remedy for past wrong is not the
exclusive basis upon which racial classification may be justified.”214 It
appears that Justice Ginsburg would likely uphold a preference-based plan
justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title
VII.
Justice Breyer’s position on affirmative action was clarified in a recent
speech he gave at a Stanford University diversity conference. Breyer
claimed that the majority opinion he joined in Grutter was the most
important decision since his appointment to the Court.215 Breyer stated that
he believed that Michigan’s “affirmative action policies were sound efforts
to level the playing field for disadvantaged minorities . . . [but] followed
that remark with the admonition that he doesn't believe that all affirmative
action efforts are right.”216 Of all the Justices forming the liberal block,
Breyer is the most likely to jump ship and strike down a preference plan
under the DSR. However, this appears unlikely for three key reasons.
First, Justice Breyer views “benign” discrimination as more constitutionally
acceptable than invidious discrimination.217 In a recent speech he stated
212. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted) (stating:
“[The] stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society . . .
and the determination to hasten its removal remains vital. One can reasonably
anticipate, therefore, that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their
minority enrollment-and the networks and opportunities thereby opened to
minority graduates-whether or not they can do so in full candor through
adoption of affirmative action plans of the kind here at issue. Without recourse
to such plans, institutions of higher education may resort to camouflage.”).
213. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302.
214. O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating also that Judge Ginsburg concurred with the majority in
this case “with the understanding, made clear by Croson, that minority preference programs
are not per se offensive to equal protection principles, nor need they be confined solely to
the redress of state-sponsored discrimination.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
215. Ray Delgado, Breyer Says Affirmative Action Case Was His “Most Important,”
STAN. REP., May 5, 2004, http://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/may5/breyer-55.html.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment but not
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that:
There’s a difference between positive and negative
discrimination; there’s a difference between affirmative action
and invidious discrimination . . . . The reason there’s a legal
difference is that it flows from a view of the 14th Amendment
that says, ‘What’s it there for? What did these people have in
mind? What were they trying to do?’ And they would have seen
it . . . as trying to give a helping hand rather than a kick in the
face.”218
Preference plans under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale can be
considered a form of benign discrimination favoring minorities. Second,
his dissent in Parents Involved stated that courts should apply strict
scrutiny, even to benign discrimination, but also that the Court can defer to
the experts when it comes to improving their programs.219 Finally, Justice
Breyer has voted to support race-based preferences in each of the four
prominent affirmative action cases he has presided over since joining the
Court in 1994220 and at least two times as an appellate judge.221 Therefore,
the opinion and dissenting in part) (“I agree with Justice Ginsburg that, in implementing the
Constitution’s equality instruction, government decision makers may properly distinguish
between policies of inclusion and exclusion . . . for the former are more likely to prove
consistent with the basic constitutional obligation that the law respect each individual
equally.”).
218. Lauren Henry & Andrew Mangino, Breyer Weighs In on Constitution, Politics,
DAILY
NEWS,
Sept.
15,
2006,
available
at
YALE
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/17882.
219. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 866 (stating:
“And what of respect for democratic local decision-making by States and school
boards? For several decades this Court has rested its public school decisions
upon [the] basic view that the Constitution grants local school districts a
significant degree of leeway where the inclusive use of race-conscious criteria is
at issue. Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face
(including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary.”)
(citations omitted).
He also stated that “a longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the
Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it.” Id.
220. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz,
539 U.S. 244 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment but not the opinion) (showing that
Justice Breyer only concurred because he wanted to reiterate Justice O’Connor’s view of the
constitutionality of government-sponsored preference plans); Parents Involved, 551 U.S.
702, 574 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See, e.g., Breyer’s Civil Liberties Record: ACLU Finds Centrist, Practical Judge,
LECTLAW, July 5, 1994, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/jud02.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009)
(stating:
“Judge Breyer has twice upheld the Boston Police Department's affirmative
action efforts against legal challenge. In the first case, he rejected the argument
that a voluntary affirmative action plan must be limited to the actual victims of
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Justice Breyer would likely uphold a preference-based plan justified by the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII.
Justice Sotomayer, assuming a successful confirmation, appears to be
a proponent of affirmative action. The press is reporting that:
Judge Sotomayor, whose parents moved to New York from
Puerto Rico, has championed the importance of considering race
and ethnicity in admissions, hiring and even judicial selection at
almost every stage of her career: as a student activist at
Princeton and at Yale Law School, as a board member of leftleaning Hispanic advocacy groups and as a federal judge arguing
for diversity on the bench.222
As for her recent judicial record, as part of a three-judge Second
Circuit panel, Sotomayor voted to uphold a district court decision allowing
the City of New Haven to avoid certifying the results of promotional
examination.223 The City chose this path because no African-Americans
and only one Hispanic firefighter qualified for promotion based on the
exam and it wanted to avoid a potential discrimination lawsuit under Title
VII.224 Sotomayer’s panel rejected a reverse discrimination claim under
Title VII by a white applicant/test-taker who likely would have received a
promotion had the test been certified.225 In doing so, the panel stated that:
[I]t simply does not follow that [the white plaintiff] has a viable
Title VII claim. To the contrary, because the Board, in refusing
to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its obligations
under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a
disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected.226

past discrimination. In the second case, he ruled against a constitutional claim
of reverse discrimination raised by white police officers.”).
222. David D. Kirkpatrick, Sotomayer’s Focus on Race Issues May be Hurdle, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/us/politics/30affirm.html.
223. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating:
“[New Haven] found itself in the unfortunate position of having no good
alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' expression of
frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that
appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have
it invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII claim.
To the contrary, because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams, was
simply trying to fulfill its obligations under Title VII when confronted with test
results that had a disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected.”).
In June 2008, Judge Sotomayer was part of a seven to six majority, which refused to allow a
rehearing en banc by the entire Second Circuit. Id. The case made its way to the Supreme
Court styled as Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 87 (stating:
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This sort of language indicates that Judge Sotomayer would likely
uphold a preference-based plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale when challenged under Title VII.
Finally, Justice Stevens appears to be solidly in the pro-affirmative
action camp. This was not always the case as, early in his career on the
Court, Stevens joined the unanimous decision against the racial preferences
under Title VII in McDonald227 and claimed that the Constitution was
colorblind in Bakke.228 Stevens also claimed in a recent speech that he
would have joined Rehnquist’s dissent in Weber had he not been
disqualified from the case.229 Today, however, his views on affirmative
action have changed and it is likely that he would vote to uphold a
voluntary, diversity-based workplace preference plan under the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale. He made this position clear in a dissenting opinion
issued in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.230 In Wygant, a public
board-of-education crafted a preference plan whereby minority teachers
could avoid certain lay-offs regardless of seniority.231 The majority held
that the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to survive scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment and struck it down.232 Justice Stevens disagreed
“[T]he Civil Service Board found itself in the unfortunate position of having no
good alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' expression of
frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that
appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have
it invalidated.”).
227. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 274.
228. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 418 (“[T]he meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is
crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally
funded program.”).
229. See Fordham University School of Law Centennial Conference, Justice John P.
Stevens, Remarks at Fordham University School of Law Centennial Conference: Learning
on the Job, 13-14, Sept. 30, 2005, available at http://law.fordham.edu/newsfiles/newsstevens.pdf [hereinafter Stevens’ Remarks] (stating that he still agrees with Rehnquist’s
interpretation of the legislative history undergirding Title VII but, since Congress has
acquiesced in the holding of Weber, he is bound by precedent to uphold subsequent similar
cases)
230. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 270-71 (detailing the agreement between the board and the union which stated
that:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority
in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the number of positions
to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order
for position for which he is certificated maintaining the above minority
balance.").
232. Id. at 283-84.
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and advocated for an early form of the Diversity Spotlight Rationale:
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past to
support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in
employing more black teachers in the future. Rather than
analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers
have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins
that were committed in the past, I believe that we should first ask
whether the Board's action advances the public interest in
educating children for the future. If so, I believe we should
consider whether that public interest, and the manner in which it
is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged
group.233
Stevens honed in on whether the preferences produced some
legitimate public purpose.234 If they did, the procedures used to implement
the preferences must be fair and the public purpose musts transcend the
nature of the harm to non-preferenced individuals.235 If the preference plan
passes this test, it is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stevens also made the argument that benign discrimination is much
different under the Equal Protection Clause than invidious
discrimination.236 Stevens reiterated his support for forward-looking
affirmative action in a concurrence in Croson although he voted to strike
down the preference plan at issue.237 Since Croson, Stevens has voted to

233. Id. at 313.
234. See id. at 315 (“[In Wygant] the collective bargaining agreement between the Union
and the Board of Education succinctly stated a valid public purpose.”).
235. See id. at 317 (stating that even if there is a valid purpose:
“to the race consciousness, however, the question that remains is whether that
public purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are disadvantaged
by the special preference the Board has given to its most recently hired minority
teachers. In my view, there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the procedures that were
used to adopt, and implement, the race-conscious action. The second is an
evaluation of the nature of the harm itself.”).
236. See id. at 316 (stating that:
“[an] inclusionary decision [i.e., benign discrimination] is consistent with the
principle that all men are created equal; the exclusionary decision [i.e.,
invidious discrimination] is at war with that principle. One decision accords
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the other does
not. Thus, consideration of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose in this case from a
race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality.”).
237. See Weber, 448 U.S. at 511, 545 (stating:
“[A] central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further the national
goal of equal opportunity for all our citizens. In order to achieve that goal, we
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uphold preference-based affirmative action plans in Adarand, Grutter,
Gratz and Parents Involved. At the end of the day, Stevens believes that
“we have learned that there is a critical difference between using race as a
criterion for hiring when the race of the employee is not directly related to
the objectives of the employer . . . and recognizing its relevance in law
enforcement and educational contexts.”238 With all of this evidence
considered, Justice Stevens would likely uphold a preference-based plan
justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title
VII.
(2) The Conservative Block
An analysis of the conservative block is much easier than an analysis
of the liberal block or of Justice Kennedy. This is because the conservative
Justices are not shy about their opinions against almost all forms of
affirmative action. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has made his
position on racial preferences crystal clear: “To pursue the concept of
racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is to
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.”239 Along these
same lines, Scalia feels that Weber should be overruled.240 In a dissent in
Johnson, Scalia stated that the
Court today completes the process of converting this from a
guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment
determinations to a guarantee that it often will. Ever so subtly,
without even alluding to the last obstacles preserved by earlier
opinions that we now push out of our path, we effectively replace
the goal of a discrimination-free society with the quite
incompatible goal of proportionate representation by race and by
sex in the workplace.241
In Grutter, he stated that the “Constitution proscribes government
must learn from our past mistakes, but I believe the Constitution requires us to
evaluate our policy decisions—including those that govern the relationships
among different racial and ethnic groups—primarily by studying their probable
impact on the future. I therefore do not agree with the premise that seems to
underlie today's decision . . . that a governmental decision that rests on a racial
classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong.”)
(citations omitted).
238. Stevens’ Remarks, supra note 229, at 14-15.
239. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
240. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no
exception.”242 Justice Scalia is skeptical of courts remedying societal
discrimination243 and believes that the Equal Protection Clause protects
individuals and, therefore, one individual cannot be injured even to assist
an entire group of minorities.244
When it comes to a workplace affirmative action plan under the DSR,
Scalia is likely to hold that prohibitions against discrimination in Title VII
are as strict as those prohibited by the Constitution.245 He also calls into
question the motives of some of the businesses that file amici briefs in
affirmative action cases. Scalia has expressed his belief by stating that it is
less costly for employers to argue for preference plans in the courts as
amici so that they can hire less qualified workers and avoid the costs of
Title VII racial discrimination lawsuits brought by minorities who can
prove institutional discrimination.246 With such strong statements on the
record, Justice Scalia is nearly certain to strike down a preference-based
plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under
Title VII.
Justice Thomas believes that the “government may not make
distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it
is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by
those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to
help those thought to be disadvantaged.”247 Justice Thomas has said that
strict scrutiny applies to any government classification on the basis of race
and it is likely that his scrutiny will be fatal regardless of whether the
preferences are benign or invidious.248 He has said: “In my mind,
government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is

242. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
244. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
245. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[While] Mr. Johnson does not
advance a constitutional claim here, it is most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place a
lesser restraint on discrimination by public actors than is established by the Constitution.”).
246. See id. at 677 (stating that the Johnson majority opinion will not:
“displease the world of corporate and governmental employers (many of whom
have filed briefs as amici in the present case, all on the side of Santa Clara) for
whom the cost of hiring less qualified workers is often substantially less--and
infinitely more predictable--than the cost of litigating Title VII cases and of
seeking to convince federal agencies by non-numerical means that no
discrimination exists.”).
247. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
248. See id. at 240-41 (explaining that strict scrutiny applies to all government
classifications based on race and good intentions on the part of the government will not
provide it refuge).
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just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each
instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”249 This will likely
doom the benign racial preferences in play under the DSR - even though it
is a private employer rather than the government executing the preferences.
In addition, Justice Thomas’ record is solidly against affirmative action,
having dissented from the judgment in Grutter250 and joined with the
opinion of the Court in Gratz and Parents Involved. With these steadfast
and long-held positions, Justice Thomas is nearly certain to strike down a
preference-based plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when
challenged under Title VII.
Justices Roberts and Alito have not made their positions on
affirmative action as clear as Justices Scalia and Thomas. They did,
however, join with Scalia and Thomas in striking down the race-based
preference plan in Parents Involved.251 Chief Justice Roberts made a strong
anti-affirmative action statement in Parents Involved, writing that the “way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”252 He rejected the argument that benign classifications on
the basis of race should receive lighter scrutiny than invidious
classifications and stated that the “argument that different rules should
govern racial classifications designed to include rather than exclude is not
new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past . . . and has been repeatedly
rejected.”253 Additionally, the Chief Justice does not appear to be a big fan
of deference to decision-makers in the context of affirmative action. He
rebutted Justice Breyer’s claim that the Court should defer to the expertise
of the local school boards by stating that such “deference ‘is fundamentally
at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on
state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.'”254
An important part of the DSR is the dereference granted to company
249. Id. at 241.
250. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting from the
judgment) (stating:
“[the Court] in an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny
analysis, upholds the Law School's program despite its obvious flaws. We have
said that when it comes to the use of race, the connection between the ends and
the means used to attain them must be precise. But here the flaw is deeper than
that; it is not merely a question of ‘fit’ between ends and means. Here the means
actually used are forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.”).
251. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 708 (announcing the Justices forming the
majority/plurality of the Court).
252. Id. at 748.
253. Id. at 743 (“Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not
mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial
classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny.”).
254. Id. at 744 (citing Johnson 534 U.S. at 506).
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executives to determine what constitutes the most effective and profitable
workforce.
Similarly, Justice Alito joined Roberts’ opinion in Parents Involved in
its entirety. More telling is that, as a judge on the Third Circuit, he joined
an opinion in a case styled Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township
of Piscataway.255 The issue in this extremely relevant case was whether
“Title VII permits an employer with a racially balanced work force to grant
a non-remedial racial preference in order to promote 'racial diversity'".256
This issue is directly on-point to the challenge that will eventually be made
under the DSR.257 Then-Judge Alito joined a majority of eight Third
Circuit judges to strike down this preference plan. The court used the
Weber and Johnson standards detailed in Part II above and found that Title
VII relevant caselaw “convinces us that a non-remedial affirmative action
plan cannot form the basis for deviating from the antidiscrimination
mandate of Title VII.”258 In the end, the Third Circuit concluded:
While we have rejected the argument that the Board's nonremedial application of the affirmative action policy is consistent
with the language and intent of Title VII, we do not reject in
principle the diversity goal articulated by the Board. Indeed, we
recognize that the differences among us underlie the richness and
strength of our Nation. Our disposition of this matter, however,
rests squarely on the foundation of Title VII. Although we
applaud the goal of racial diversity, we cannot agree that Title
VII permits an employer to advance that goal through nonremedial discriminatory measures.259
This is a strong statement against the DSR as applied to Title VII. It is
also the primary Circuit Court case law on point. The Supreme Court
nearly granted certiorari in this case but it was settled at the last minute.
Interestingly, various civil rights groups paid most of the settlement money
to avoid a potential bad result in the Supreme Court – an action that
foreshadows the predications made in this paper.260 Therefore, based on the
255. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1547.
256. Id. at 1549.
257. The only difference lies in the fact that the preferences in Taxman were crafted by a
public employer and this article anticipates a Supreme Court challenge against a private
employer based on the amici briefs in Grutter.
258. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563.
259. Id. at 1567.
260. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Financial Details are Revealed in Affirmative Action
TIMES.
Dec.
6,
1997,
available
at
Settlement,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/06/nyregion/financial-details-are-revealed-in-affirmativeaction-settlement.html (stating:
“[The] coalition, in a highly unusual move, offered last month to pay most of
the $433,500 settlement to Sharon Taxman, a white teacher at Piscataway High
School whom the board had dismissed in a 1989 budget reduction to preserve a
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evidence above, it appears that both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
would strike down a preference-based plan justified by the Diversity
Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII.
(3) Justice Kennedy
This may indeed be the era of the Kennedy Court instead of the
Roberts Court.261 Anthony Kennedy currently presides as the decisive vote
between two camps of Justices each seeking to form a majority. Although
he votes with the conservative block more often than not, Justice Kennedy
often writes separately “to moderate the result.”262 When it comes to
affirmative action, Kennedy has stated that a racial preference, “when
resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, containing
within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the
idea of equality.”263 He has also opined that to “make race matter now so
that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to
overcome.”264
However, Justice Kennedy does believe that racial preferences can be
constitutional, but only in “one context” – to foster student diversity in the
public educational arena.265 In this particular context, Kennedy requires
governmental preferences to undergo a strict scrutiny analysis to meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.266 This adherence to strict
black teacher's job.”). “The abrupt settlement, on Nov. 21, ended the eightyear-old case against the school board just two months before it was scheduled
to be heard by the United States Supreme Court. Civil rights leaders offered to
help finance the settlement because they feared the Supreme Court would use
the case to strike down almost all affirmative action programs.” Id.
261. David Cole, The “Kennedy Court,” THE NATION. July 14, 2006,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060731/cole [hereinafter Kennedy Court]. But see Linda
Greenhouse, At Supreme Court, 5-4 Rulings Fade, But Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/us/23memo.html?_r=1
(“[Justice
Kennedy’s] dominance last term was so complete that, of 68 decisions, he cast only two
dissenting votes. He has already dissented five times [during the 2007-2008] term. So have
Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens. In other words, no
longer the essential justice, Anthony Kennedy now looks like just one of the pack.”).
262. Kennedy Court, supra note 261. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
263. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782.
265. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
266. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that:
Powell’s Bakke opinion “is based on the principle that a university admissions
program may take account of race as one, non-predominant factor in a system
designed to consider each applicant as an individual, provided the program can
meet the test of strict scrutiny by the judiciary. This is a unitary formulation. If
strict scrutiny is abandoned or manipulated to distort its real and accepted
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scrutiny is what caused Kennedy to dissent in Grutter267 and join the Court
in striking down affirmative action plans in Gratz268 and Parents
Involved269 (albeit with a more moderate concurrence).270 Each of those
three cases had diversity as the justification for the affirmative action plans
in controversy. The primary difference between Grutter, Gratz and
Parents Involved and a future workplace preference plan is the one thing
that matters most to Kennedy – the special context of the educational arena.
Today, it appears that Kennedy’s position on race-based preferences
has not changed drastically. A recent exchange from oral arguments in
Ricci v. DeStefano indicates that he is still skeptical of racial classifications
by the government which take away opportunities from non-preferenced
individuals:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Counsel, [the employer city that failed to
certify the test] looked at the results, and it classified the
successful and unsuccessful applicants by race.

meaning, the Court lacks authority to approve the use of race even in this
modest, limited way. The opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the
correct rule for resolving this case. The Court, however, does not apply strict
scrutiny.”).
267. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[The] Court, however, does not apply strict
scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling
precedents.”).
268. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (joining the majority opinion which stated that:
“[t]o withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents must demonstrate that
the University's use of race in its current admissions program employs
‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’
Because ‘[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classification,’ . . . our review
of whether such requirements have been met must entail ‘'a most searching
examination.’” We find that the University's policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission,
to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that
respondents claim justifies their program.”) (citations omitted).
269. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[As the Seattle]
district fails to account for the classification system it has chosen, despite what appears to be
its ill fit, Seattle has not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends; and
thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny.”).
270. Id. at 782 (stating:
“I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases
before us and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I also join Parts III-A
and III-C for reasons provided below. My views do not allow me to join the
balance of the opinion by The Chief Justice, which seems to me to be
inconsistent in both its approach and its implications with the history, meaning,
and reach of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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MR. KNEEDLER: It -- it-JUSTICE KENNEDY: And then -- and you want us to say this isn't
race? I have -- I have trouble with this argument.
MR. KNEEDLER: No, with respect, it did not classify according to
race; it looked in general terms. It did not have the names of
individual people. It looked in general terms at what the racial
disparity of the test was. It just –
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It didn't look at names; it just looked at
the label of what their race was. That's all they were concerned
about.
MR. KNEEDLER: Title VII's disparate impact test requires -requires an employer to be aware of and respond –
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that's inconsistent with your answer to
the Chief Justice who was exploring whether or not what we have
here is a -- is a racial criteria, pure and simple, and you say, well,
it's general. And then we point out that each applicant didn't
have his name, but they had his or her race. 271
This back and forth—picked up on by the conservative Chief
Justice—is reminiscent of Kennedy’s concurrence in Croson where he
stated that the “moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of
the Equal Protection Clause.”272 When it comes to such classifications,
Kennedy’s concurrences in general appear to favor the use of race only as a
last resort. He would instead encourage affirmative action proponents to
strive to promote diversity by non-referential means. Although Kennedy
was not on the Court for the Weber and Johnson, the evidence indicates
that he will likely limit his approval of affirmative action to the educational
arena – the “one context” he deems it legitimate. This means that Justice
Kennedy would likely strike down a preference-based plan justified by the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII.

271. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, Ricci v. DeStefano, Apr. 22, 2009, (Nos. 071428,
08-328),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1428.pdf.
It
appeared that Justice Kennedy “seemed troubled by the city's decision to throw out all
results of a promotion exam only after officials learned that no African-American candidates
had scored high enough to be promoted.” Warren Richey, Reverse-Discrimination Case
MONITOR,
Apr.
22,
2009,
Splits
Supreme
Court,
C.S.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0423/p02s01-usju.html%20.
272. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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(4) The Votes
Considering precedent, prior public statements of the current Justices
and the potential conflict between the DSR and the express language of
Title VII – it is likely that a voluntary, diversity-based workplace
affirmative action plan will be struck down by the current Court.273 This
paper predicts a five to four split decision with the conservative block and
the conservative-leaning Justice Kennedy in the majority. This paper also
predicts the issuance of strong and passionate dissenting opinions from the
liberal block.
The majority opinion might utilize any or each of the following
reasons to limit Grutter to the academic context: (1) the workplace is much
different from the academic environment where academic freedom might
allow racial and gender preferences to attain a diverse student body of
future leaders; (2) taking away opportunities under the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale is not as compelling as doing so under the Remedial Rationale—
especially in the business context where diversity is utilized in part increase
profits; and (3) Title VII was enacted to eliminate racial discrimination of
any type—including so-called reverse discrimination against white
employees and applicants and the language of the statute makes this
mandate expressly clear. To justify this result, the Court might dispense
with the Weber and Johnson tests and, instead, import the strict scrutiny
test from the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection cases to its Title VII
analysis of the DSR. This option would not require Justice Kennedy to
overrule Weber or Johnson – he could merely limit those holdings to
workplace preferences justified by the Remedial Rationale.
In summary, the following chart predicts the particular votes of the
current Justices in the hypothetical case of DSR preference program
challenged under Title VII:

273. See also Jonathan A. Segal, Diversity:
Direct or Disguised? Recent Supreme Court Decisions Don't Resolve whether and when
you Can Focus on Race in Hiring Decisions, H.R. MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1, available
at http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/administration-human/664553-1.html
(stating:
“[Some] commentators believe these ground-breaking decisions [Grutter and
Gratz], which generally recognize the importance of student-body diversity in
public higher education, provide a green light for employers to consider race
and ethnicity for the purpose of achieving a diverse workforce. However, such
an interpretation is probably a mistake. Nothing in the court's opinions . . .
expressly protects consideration of race, ethnicity or other protected
classifications in the private employment context.”).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has decided only a dozen prominent cases on the
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topic of affirmative action.274 The impact of each decision, however, has
profoundly shaped public policy and societal expectations. Few topics
generate such passion and controversy within academia, business,
government, the legal profession and the social sciences – not to mention
among the citizenry and the press.275 The paper demonstrates that the
affirmative action of our parents will not be the affirmative action of our
children. What is significantly different today is that the justification for
preference plans has changed drastically from backward-looking to
forward-looking. The Remedial Rationale is fading into history and the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale is emerging as the new frontier.
In the private workplace arena, prominent businesses now claim an
interest in fostering diversity within their ranks to better compete, market
and think in an ever-globalizing economy. Diversity Spotlight Rationalebased arguments such as these butt heads with the express language and
anti-discriminatory thrust of Title VII and with affirmative action
opponents. This article predicts that the current Supreme Court will side
with a strict statutory interpretation of Title VII and strike down a
voluntary, forward-looking, diversity-based workplace affirmative action
plan. This prediction is based on Justice Kennedy’s general antiaffirmative action stance, a conservative-learning Court and the written
positions staked out by Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, Roberts and
Kennedy (i.e., the dissents in Grutter, the majority opinions in Gratz and
Parents Involved and Justice Alito’s vote in Taxman). Casey Stengel
warned that people should “never make predictions, especially about the
274. See, e.g., Supreme Court Collection: Topic: Affirmative Action, CORNELL UNIV.
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cases/topics/tog_affirmative_action.html
(linking to twelve Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action) and Timeline of
Affirmative
Action
Milestones,
INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/affirmativetimeline1.html (last visited May 30, 2009)
(presenting a timeline of key affirmative action decisions from the Supreme Court).
275. See, e.g., Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Conflicted Views of
Affirmative
Action,
May
14,
2003,
available
at
http://peoplepress.org/report/184/conflicted-views-of-affirmative-action (stating:
“[A] new Pew Research Center nationwide survey finds a growing majority of
the public supporting the general idea of affirmative action. But the poll results
also reflect the public's complicated and sometimes contradictory attitudes
about the subject. There is support for the rationale of affirmative action such
as overcoming past discrimination or increasing the diversity of students in
college. But at the same time, Americans question the fairness of such
programs, the rationale notwithstanding. When the details of specific
affirmative action programs are raised, public reservations increase. Further,
when people are questioned about programs involving preferential treatment for
minorities, opinion turns negative. On all questions about affirmative action
there are predictable racial differences in opinion, but significant gender
differences are evident as well, even when the issue of gender inequality is not
mentioned in the question.”)
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future.”276 This statement is partially true in the sense that predicting
Supreme Court opinions—especially those of Justice Kennedy—can be
dicey.277 Only time will tell how the current Court will handle the first
affirmative action case coming from the private workplace under the
Diversity Spotlight Rationale. However, one fact is clear – nearly one
hundred prominent American businesses stated unabashedly in Grutter that
they support and may create forward-looking preference plans based solely
on diversity for the sake of diversity. The seriousness of this fact makes
predictive papers such as this an important part of the discussion.
As this Diversity Spotlight Rationale gains prominence in the
workplace, it is only a matter of time before a white employee loses an
employment opportunity and brings a reverse discrimination lawsuit. The
controversial nature of forward-looking, diversity-based preference plans
combined with the history of circuit splits regarding affirmative action
should provide compelling reasons278 for the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari upon appeal.279 In generating a decision, the Justices have two
276. See,
e.g.,
“Famous
Quotes
about
Predictions,”
QUOTESDADDY,
http://www.quotesdaddy.com/quote/153924/casey-stengel/never-make-predictionsespecially-about-the-future (last visited May 31, 2009).
277. See, e.g., Associated Press, DeLay Slams Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, MSNBC,
Apr. 20, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7550959/ (“[Although Justice
Kennedy] was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Reagan, a conservative icon, he
has aroused conservatives’ ire by sometimes agreeing with the court’s more liberal
members.”).
278. The Supreme Court has discretion to grant or deny certiorari under Rule 10 of the
Rule of the Supreme Court. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI,
SUP. CT. R. 10, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/10.html (last visited May
31, 2009) (“[Review] on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”).
279. Id. at 10(a) and 10(c) (stating:
“In granting certiorari, the Court is likely to look to: (a) [whether] a United
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter . . . and/or
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.”).
The Third Circuit has held that Title VII does not allow for workplace affirmative action
plans justified by the DSR. Taxman v. Bd. of Ed. of the Twp of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547,
1563 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that “[o]ur analysis of the statute and the caselaw convinces us
that a non-remedial affirmative action plan cannot form the basis for deviating from the
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.”). There is a strong chance that a least one of the
other twelve circuit courts of appeals will rule differently – as they have for decades in the
affirmative action area. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, No-Good Lazy Justices, SLATE, July 15,
2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2103909/ (“[W]e live with circuit splits all the time. It felt
like the circuits were split over affirmative action for about a million years. The Supreme
Court eventually takes these cases and resolves them, as is its mandate.”). This will create
the circuit split that the Justices can use as a compelling reason for granting certiorari.
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primary options: (1) restrain the reach of Grutter and limit Justice
O’Connor’s opinion to the public higher education arena or (2) expand the
DSR as legitimate under Title VII within the private workplace arena.
Although this paper predicts that the current conservative-leaning Court
will opt for option (1), there is little doubt that the Diversity Spotlight
Rationale has taken its place at the frontier of affirmative action
jurisprudence. Even if the Court strikes down an early DSR program,
employers and interest groups will continue to tweak their plans seeking
judicial approval. Additionally, the public policy and public opinion battle
revolving around affirmative action is sure to continue before and after the
Supreme Court enters the fray.

Additionally, the Diversity Spotlight Rationale under Title VII and its clear antidiscrimination mandate is certainly an important question of federal law that has not been
settled by the Supreme Court. This provides a compelling reason for a grant of certiorari.

